Linear Temporal Justification Logics with Past Operators by Ghari, Meghdad
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
00
16
7v
2 
 [c
s.L
O]
  1
7 A
ug
 20
19
Linear Temporal Justification Logics with Past
Operators
Meghdad Ghari⋆
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities,
University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
and
School of Mathematics, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM),
P.O.Box: 19395-5746, Tehran, Iran
ghari@ipm.ir
Abstract. In this paper we present various temporal justification logics
involving both past and future time modalities. We combine Artemov’s
logic of proofs with linear temporal logic (with both past and future oper-
ators), and establish its soundness and completeness. Then we investigate
several principles describing the interaction of justification and time.
1 Introduction
Linear temporal logics of knowledge are useful for reasoning about situations where
the knowledge of an agent is changed over time [8, 15, 16]. The temporal component
in such systems is usually interpreted over a discrete linear model of time with finite
past and infinite future; in this case (N,<) can be chosen as the flow of time (for
a logic of knowledge and branching time see [24]). And the knowledge component
is typically modeled using the modal logic S5.
This paper continues the study of temporal justification logics from [5, 6]. Tem-
poral justification logic is a new family of temporal logics of knowledge in which
the knowledge of agents is modeled using a justification logic. Justification logics
are modal-like logics that provide a framework for reasoning about epistemic jus-
tifications (see [3, 4] for a survey). The language of multi-agent justification logics
extends the language of propositional logic by justification terms and expressions
of the form [t]iϕ, with the intended meaning “t is agent i’s justification for ϕ.”
The Logic of Proofs LP was the first logic in the family of justification logics, in-
troduced by Artemov in [1, 2]. The logic of proofs is a justification counterpart of
the modal epistemic logic S4.
It is known that linear temporal logic with only future time operators is weak
to fully express some properties of systems, such as unique initial states and syn-
chrony (cf. [15, 10]). Neither of the temporal justification logics of [5] and [6]
contains past time operators in their languages. The aim of this paper is to add
past time operators to the temporal justification logic of [6], and to study principles
describing the interaction of justifications and time.
⋆ This research was in part supported by a grant from IPM (No. 96030426).
2 Language
In the following, let h be a fixed number of agents, Ag = {1, . . . , h} the set of
all agents, Const a countable set of justification constants, Var a countable set of
justification variables, and Prop a countable set of atomic propositions.
The set of justification terms Tm is defined inductively by
t ∶∶= c ∣ x ∣ !t ∣ t + t ∣ t ⋅ t ,
where c ∈ Const and x ∈ Var.
The set of formulas Fml is inductively defined by
ϕ ∶∶= P ∣  ∣ ϕ→ ϕ ∣◯ϕ ∣ w ϕ ∣ ϕU ϕ ∣ ϕS ϕ ∣ [t]iϕ ,
where i ∈ Ag, t ∈ Tm, and P ∈ Prop. The temporal operators ◯, w , U , S are
respectively called next (or tomorrow), weak previous (or weak yesterday), until,
and since. An until formula is a formula of the form ϕU ψ for some formulas ϕ
and ψ, and a justification assertion is a formula of the form [t]iϕ for some formula
ϕ and term t.
We use the following usual abbreviations:
¬ϕ ∶= ϕ→  ⊺ ∶= ¬
ϕ ∨ψ ∶= ¬ϕ→ ψ ϕ ∧ ψ ∶= ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
ϕ↔ ψ ∶= (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ) s ϕ ∶= ¬w ¬ϕ
◇ϕ ∶= ⊺U ϕ ◻ϕ ∶= ¬◇ ¬ϕ
xϕ ∶= ⊺S ϕ ⊟ϕ ∶= ¬x ¬ϕ.
The temporal operators s ,◻,◇,⊟,x are respectively called strong previous,
always from now on (or henceforth), sometime (or eventuality), has-always-been,
and once.
Associativity and precedence of connectives, as well as the corresponding omis-
sion of brackets, are handled in the usual manner.
Subformulas are defined as usual. The set of subformulas Sub(χ) of a formula
χ is inductively given by:
Sub(P ) ∶= {P} Sub() ∶= {}
Sub(ϕ→ ψ) ∶= {ϕ→ ψ} ∪ Sub(ϕ) ∪ Sub(ψ) Sub([t]iϕ) ∶= {[t]iϕ} ∪ Sub(ϕ)
Sub(ϕU ψ) ∶= {ϕU ψ} ∪ Sub(ϕ) ∪ Sub(ψ) Sub(◯ϕ) ∶= {◯ϕ} ∪ Sub(ϕ)
Sub(ϕS ψ) ∶= {ϕS ψ} ∪ Sub(ϕ) ∪ Sub(ψ) Sub(w ϕ) ∶= {w ϕ} ∪ Sub(ϕ).
For a set S of formulas, Sub(S) denotes the set of all subformulas of the for-
mulas from S.
The combined language of justification logic and temporal logic allows for ex-
pressing some properties of systems that are not expressible in the known logics
of knowledge and time. For example,
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– “t justifies ϕ for agent i until ψ holds” can be expressed by ([t]iϕ)U ψ.
– “t justifies ϕ for agent i since ψ holds” can be expressed by ([t]iϕ)S ψ.
– “t is agent i’s conclusive evidence that ϕ is true” can be expressed by ◻ [t]iϕ
or even by ⊟ [t]iϕ ∧ ◻ [t]iϕ.
– “If agent i knows that ϕ for reason t, then ϕ is always true” can be expressed
by [t]iϕ→ ◻ϕ.
– “Agent i will have not forgotten her justification t for ϕ by tomorrow, providing
she possesses the justification now” can be expressed by [t]iϕ→◯ [t]iϕ.
– “Agent i will learn that t is a justification for ϕ tomorrow, but she does not
know it now” can be expressed by ¬ [t]iϕ ∧◯ [t]iϕ.
More connections between justification and time will be explored in Sections
8, 10, and 11.
3 Axioms
The axiom system for temporal justification logic consists of three parts, namely
propositional logic, temporal logic, and justification logic.
Propositional Logic
For propositional logic, we take
1. all propositional tautologies (Taut)
as axioms and the rule modus ponens, as usual:
⊢ ϕ ⊢ ϕ→ ψ
⊢ ψ
(MP) .
Temporal Logic
For the temporal part, we use a system of [11, 13, 14] and [19, 18, 10] with axioms
Axioms for the future operators:
2. ◯(ϕ→ ψ)→ (◯ϕ→◯ψ) (◯-k)
3. ◻(ϕ→ ψ) → (◻ϕ→ ◻ψ) (◻-k)
4. ◯¬ϕ↔ ¬◯ϕ (fun)
5. ◻(ϕ→◯ϕ) → (ϕ→ ◻ϕ) (ind)
6. ϕU ψ →◇ψ (U 1)
7. ϕU ψ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧◯(ϕU ψ)) (U 2)
Axioms for the past operators:
8. ⊟(ϕ→ ψ) → (⊟ϕ→ ⊟ψ) (⊟-k)
9. w (ϕ→ ψ)→ (w ϕ→ w ψ) (w -k)
10. s ϕ→ w ϕ (sw)
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11. xw  (initial)
12. ⊟(ϕ→ w ϕ)→ (ϕ→ ⊟ϕ) (⊟-ind)
13. ϕS ψ →xψ (S 1)
14. ϕS ψ↔ ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ s (ϕS ψ)) (S 2)
Axioms for the interaction of the future and past operators:
15. ϕ→◯ s ϕ (FP)
16. ϕ→ w◯ϕ (PF)
and rules
⊢ ϕ
⊢◯ϕ
(◯-nec) ,
⊢ ϕ
⊢ w ϕ
(w -nec) ,
⊢ ϕ
⊢ ◻ϕ
(◻-nec) ,
⊢ ϕ
⊢ ⊟ϕ
(⊟-nec).
Let LTLP denote the axiomatic system given by the above axioms and rules.
Justification Logic
Finally, for the justification logic part, we use a multi-agent version of the Logic
of Proofs [2, 7, 12, 25] with axioms
17. [t]i(ϕ→ ψ)→ ([s]iϕ→ [t ⋅ s]iψ) (application)
18. [t]iϕ→ [t + s]iϕ, [s]iϕ→ [t + s]iϕ (sum)
19. [t]iϕ→ ϕ (reflexivity)
20. [t]iϕ→ [!t]i [t]iϕ (positive introspection)
and the iterated axiom necessitation rule
[cjn]in . . . [cj1]i1ϕ ∈ CS
⊢ [cjn]in . . . [cj1]i1ϕ
(iax-nec)
where the constant specification CS is a set of formulas of the form
[cjn]in . . . [cj1]i1ϕ
where n ≥ 1, i1, . . . , in are arbitrary agents, cjn , . . . , cj1 are justification constants,
and ϕ is an axiom instance of propositional logic, temporal logic, or justification
logic. Moreover, a constant specification CS should be downward closed in the sense
that whenever [cjn]in [cjn−1]in−1 . . . [cj1]i1ϕ ∈ CS, then [cjn−1]in−1 . . . [cj1]i1ϕ ∈ CS
for n > 1.
Definition 3.1. A constant specification CS for a justification logic L is axiomat-
ically appropriate provided, for every axiom instance ϕ of L and for every n ≥ 1,
and every i1, . . . , in ∈ Ag, [cjn]in . . . [cj1]i1ϕ ∈ CS for some justification constants
cjn , . . . , cj1 .
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Remark 3.2. It is perhaps worth noting that the temporal justification logics of
[5, 6] are formalized using the following axiom necessitation rule
[c]iϕ ∈ CS
⊢ [c]iϕ
(ax-nec) .
We prefer (iax-nec) to (ax-nec) because the iterated axiom necessitation rule en-
ables us to prove the internalization property (see Section 9). All the results of this
paper, except the results of Section 9, continue to hold if the logics are formalized
by the rule (ax-nec).
For a given constant specification CS, we use LPLTLPCS to denote the Hilbert
system given by the axioms and rules for propositional logic, temporal logic, and
justification logic as presented above. We write ⊢CS ϕ if a formula ϕ is derivable
in LPLTLPCS.
The definition of derivation from a set of premises is standard. A formula ϕ is
derivable from the set of assumptions Γ , written Γ ⊢CS ϕ, iff ϕ is in Γ , or is one
of the axioms of LPLTLPCS, or follows from derivable formulas through applications
of the rules (MP), (ax-nec), and necessitation, where necessitation rules can be
applied only to derivations without assumptions. In other words:
ϕ ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢CS ϕ
,
ϕ ∈ Axiom
Γ ⊢CS ϕ
,
Γ ⊢CS χ ∆ ⊢CS χ → ψ
Γ,∆ ⊢CS ψ
,
[c]iϕ ∈ CS
Γ ⊢ [c]iϕ
,
⊢CS ϕ
Γ ⊢CS ◯ϕ
,
⊢CS ϕ
Γ ⊢CS w ϕ
,
⊢CS ϕ
Γ ⊢CS ◻ϕ
,
⊢CS ϕ
Γ ⊢CS ⊟ϕ
.
Note that the Deduction Theorem holds in LPLTLPCS. It is easy to show that:
Γ ⊢CS ϕ iff there exist ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ such that ⊢CS (ψ1 ∧⋯ ∧ψn)→ ϕ.
Temporal justification logic LPLTL of [6] is a fragment of LPLTLP without past
operators w and S , and without axioms and rules involving past operators.
The axiomatization for linear time temporal logic given in [11, 13, 14, 17]
includes the following axioms
◻ϕ→ (ϕ ∧◯◻ϕ),
⊟ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ w ⊟ϕ).
The following lemma shows that we do not need these axioms since in our formal-
ization ◻ and ⊟ are defined operators.
Lemma 3.3. The following formulas are provable in LTLP:
1. ◻ϕ→ (ϕ ∧◯◻ϕ).
2. ◻ϕ→◯ϕ.
5
3. ⊟ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ w ⊟ϕ).
4. ⊟ϕ→ wϕ.
In item 1, (MP) is the only rule that is used in the derivation.
Proof. 1. ◻ϕ stands for ¬(⊺U ¬ϕ). Hence from (U 2) we get
¬ϕ ∨◯(⊺U ¬ϕ)→ ⊺U ¬ϕ.
Taking the contrapositive yields
¬(⊺U ¬ϕ)→ ¬(¬ϕ ∨◯(⊺U ¬ϕ)).
By propositional reasoning and (fun) we get
¬(⊺U ¬ϕ)→ (ϕ ∧◯¬(⊺U ¬ϕ)),
which is
◻ϕ→ (ϕ ∧◯◻ϕ).
2. From item 1 and propositional reasoning we get
◻ϕ→ ϕ (1)
◻ϕ→◯◻ ϕ (2)
From (1) and (◯-nec) we get
◯(◻ϕ→ ϕ)
which, in turn, using (◯-k) and propositional reasoning gives
◯◻ ϕ→◯ϕ .
By propositional reasoning and using (2) we obtain
◻ϕ→◯ϕ.
3. Similar to item 1.
4. Similar to item 2. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.4. The following formulas are provable in LTLP:
1. sϕ→ ¬w.
2. w (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn)↔ (wϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ wϕn).
3. s (ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn)↔ ( sϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ sϕn).
4. w (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn−1 ∨ϕn)↔ ( sϕ1 ∨ sϕ2 ∨ . . . ∨ sϕn−1 ∨ wϕn).
5. w (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn)↔ (wϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ wϕn).
6. ◯(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ϕn)↔ (◯ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧◯ϕn).
7. ◯(ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn)↔ (◯ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨◯ϕn).
Lemma 3.5. The following formulas are provable in LTLP:
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1. ϕ ∧ψ U σ → ψU (σ ∧ ( sψ)S ϕ).
2. ϕ ∧ψ S σ → ψS (σ ∧ (◯ψ)U ϕ).
Lemma 3.6. The following rules are derivable in LTLP:
⊢ ϕ→ ψ ⊢ ϕ→◯ϕ
⊢ ϕ→ ◻ψ
⊢ ϕ→◯ϕ
⊢ ϕ→ ◻ϕ
⊢ ϕ→ ψ ⊢ ϕ→ wϕ
⊢ ϕ→ ⊟ψ
⊢ ϕ→ wϕ
⊢ ϕ→ ⊟ϕ
Lemma 3.7. The following rules are derivable in LTLP:
χ→ ¬ψ ∧◯χ
χ→ ¬(ϕU ψ)
χ → ¬ψ ∧ wχ
χ → ¬(ϕS ψ)
χ→ ¬ψ ∧◯(χ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ))
χ→ ¬(ϕU ψ)
(U -R)
χ→ ¬ψ ∧ w (χ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ))
χ → ¬(ϕS ψ)
(S -R) .
4 Maximal consistent sets
All the results of this section hold for extensions of LTLP, i.e. LPLTL, LPLTLP, and
all extensions introduced in Sections 8, 9, 11. Let L be an extension of LTLP, and
let ⊢CS denote derivability in LCS, where CS is a constant specification for L.
For a formula χ, let
Aχ ∶= Sub(χ) ∪ Sub(⊺S w ),
Sub+(χ) ∶= Aχ ∪ {¬ψ ∣ ψ ∈ Aχ}.
Definition 4.1. Let CS be a constant specification for L.
– A set Γ of formulas is called LCS-consistent (or simply CS-consistent) if Γ /⊢CS
.
– A set Γ of formulas is called maximal if it has no LCS-consistent proper exten-
sion of formulas.
– A set Γ ⊆ Sub+(χ) is called χ-maximal if it has no LCS-consistent proper
extension of formulas from Sub+(χ).
Let MCSχ denote the set of all χ-maximally LCS-consistent subsets of Sub
+(χ).
Note that MCSχ is a finite set.
Let MCS denote the set of all maximally LCS-consistent sets, and for Γ ∈MCS,
let
Γ ∶= Γ ∩ Sub+(χ).
Lemma 4.2.
MCSχ = {Γ ∣ Γ ∈MCS}.
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Proof. (⊆) Let ∆ ∈ MCSχ. Then ∆ can be extended to a maximal CS-consistent
set Γ ∈MCS. It is easy to show that ∆ = Γ ∩ Sub+(χ), and thus ∆ = Γ .
(⊇) It is sufficient to show that for each Γ ∈ MCS the set Γ is CS-consistent
and χ-maximal. The CS-consistency of Γ follows from the CS-consistency of Γ . In
order to show the χ-maximality of Γ , suppose towards a contradiction that Γ has
a CS-consistent proper extension Σ ⊆ Sub+(χ). Let ϕ ∈ Σ ∖ Γ . Thus ϕ /∈ Γ , and
hence ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Since ϕ ∈ Sub+(χ) we can distinguish the following cases:
– ϕ ∈ Aχ. In this case ¬ϕ ∈ Sub
+(χ), and hence ¬ϕ ∈ Γ ⊆ Σ, which contradicts
ϕ ∈ Σ.
– ϕ = ¬ψ and ψ ∈ Aχ. In this case ¬ϕ = ¬¬ψ ∈ Γ , and hence ψ ∈ Γ . Thus
ψ ∈ Γ ⊆ Σ, which contradicts ¬ψ ∈ Σ. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.3. Let Γ ∈MCSχ.
1. If Γ ⊢CS ϕ, then ⊢CS ⋀Γ → ϕ.
2. If ϕ ∈ Aχ and ϕ /∈ Γ , then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ .
3. If ϕ ∈ Sub+(χ) and Γ ⊢CS ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ .
4. If ψ ∈ Sub+(χ), ϕ ∈ Γ and ⊢CS ϕ→ ψ, then ψ ∈ Γ .
Proof. The proof of all items are standard. ⊓⊔
We define the relation R◯ on MCSχ as follows:
ΓR◯∆ iff {◯ϕ ∣ ϕ ∈∆} ⊆ Γ.
From this definition we immediately get the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.4. The relation R◯ is serial. That is for each Γ ∈ MCSχ, there exists
∆ ∈MCSχ with ΓR◯∆.
Proof. For Γ ∈MCSχ, let
Λ ∶= {ϕ ∣◯ϕ ∈ Γ}.
We first show that Λ is CS-consistent. If Λ is not CS-consistent, then
⊢CS ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ϕn → 
for some ◯ϕ1, . . . ,◯ϕn ∈ Γ . Thus
⊢CS ◯ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧◯ϕn →◯.
Hence ◯ ∈ Γ . Since ⊢CS ◯→ , we have ◯→  ∈ Γ , and hence  ∈ Γ which is
a contradiction.
Since Λ is CS-consistent, it can be extended to a maximally CS-consistent set
∆ ∈MCS. It is easy to prove that ΓR◯∆ as desired. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.5. Let Γ ,∆ ∈MCSχ and ΓR◯∆.
1. ◯ϕ ∈ Γ iff ϕ ∈∆.
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2. ϕ ∈ Γ iff sϕ ∈∆.
3. ϕ ∈ Γ iff wϕ ∈ ∆.
Proof. 1. The proof of the if direction follows from the definition of R◯. For the
only if direction, suppose towards a contradiction that ϕ /∈ ∆. Thus ¬ϕ ∈ ∆.
Since ΓR◯∆, we get ◯¬ϕ ∈ Γ and hence ¬◯ϕ ∈ Γ , which would contradict
the assumption ◯ϕ ∈ Γ .
2. If ϕ ∈ Γ , then by the axiom (FP) we get ◯ s ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence by item 1 we
get s ϕ ∈ ∆. For the converse, suppose that s ϕ ∈ ∆. Then, by the definition
of R◯, ◯ s ϕ ∈ Γ . Assume to obtain a contradiction that ϕ /∈ Γ . Then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ ,
and by the axiom (FP) we get ◯ s ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Since ⊢CS ◯ s ¬ϕ → ¬◯ s ϕ, we
arrive at a contradiction ¬◯ s ϕ ∈ Γ .
3. The only if direction is obtained from item 2 and axiom (sw). For the converse
suppose w ϕ ∈∆. It follows that ◯w ϕ ∈ Γ . Assume to obtain a contradiction
that ϕ /∈ Γ . Then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence ◯ s ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Since ⊢CS ◯ s ¬ϕ → ¬◯w ϕ,
we arrive at a contradiction ¬◯w ϕ ∈ Γ . ⊓⊔
Definition 4.6. Γ ∈MCSχ is called initial if w ∈ Γ .
Lemma 4.7. Given Γ ∈ MCSχ, Γ is not initial iff there exists ∆ ∈ MCSχ such
that ∆R◯Γ .
Proof. Suppose that Γ ∈MCSχ is not initial. Let
Λ ∶= {◯ϕ ∣ ϕ ∈ Γ}.
We first prove that Λ is CS-consistent. If Λ is not CS-consistent, then
⊢CS ◯ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧◯ϕn → 
for some ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Γ . Using item 5 of Lemma 3.4, we have
⊢CS w◯ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ w◯ϕn → w .
By axiom (PF)
⊢CS ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ϕn → w .
Hence w  ∈ Γ . Since w  ∈ Sub+(χ), we have w  ∈ Γ , contradicting our as-
sumption that Γ is not initial. Since Λ is CS-consistent, it can be extended to a
maximally CS-consistent set ∆ ∈MCS. Clearly, ∆R◯Γ as desired.
Conversely, suppose that there exists ∆ ∈ MCSχ such that ∆R◯Γ . Suppose
towards a contradiction that w  ∈ Γ . By item 3 of Lemma 4.5, we get  ∈ ∆,
which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.8. If Γ is initial, then sϕ /∈ Γ for all formulas ϕ.
Proof. Suppose Γ is initial. Then w  ∈ Γ , and then w  ∈ Γ . We suppose that
s ϕ ∈ Γ for some formula ϕ and derive a contradiction. By item 1 of Lemma 3.4,
we have ⊢CS s ϕ → ¬w , and hence s ϕ → ¬w  ∈ Γ . Thus ¬w  ∈ Γ which is a
contradiction. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 4.9. Let Γ ,∆ ∈MCSχ.
ΓR◯∆ iff /⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬◯⋀∆.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose ΓR◯∆. Then {◯ϕ ∣ ϕ ∈ ∆} ⊆ Γ . By item 6 of Lemma 3.4,
we have
⋀Γ ∧◯⋀∆ ∈ Γ.
Therefore,
/⊢CS ¬(⋀Γ ∧◯⋀∆),
and hence
⊬CS ⋀Γ → ¬◯⋀∆.
(⇐) Suppose ⊬CS ⋀Γ → ¬◯⋀∆. Thus there is Σ ∈MCS such that ⋀Γ ∧◯⋀∆ ∈
Σ.
By Lemma 4.4, there is Π ∈MCSχ such that ΣR◯Π . Next we show that Γ = Σ
and ∆ =Π , from which it follows that ΓR◯∆.
Proof of Γ = Σ:
From ⋀Γ ∧◯⋀∆ ∈ Σ, it follows that Γ ⊆ Σ, which immediately implies Γ = Σ,
since Γ is χ-maximal.
Proof of ∆ =Π :
If ϕ ∈ ∆, then ◯ϕ ∈ Σ. Thus, by Lemma 4.5, ϕ ∈ Π . Since ϕ ∈ Sub+(χ), we get
ϕ ∈ Π . Thus ∆ ⊆ Π , which immediately implies ∆ = Π , by the χ-maximality of
∆. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.10. Let Γ,∆ ∈MCSχ.
ΓR◯∆ iff ⊬CS ⋀∆ → ¬ s ⋀Γ .
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 4.9 and the following fact
⊢CS ϕ→ ¬◯ψ iff ⊢CS ψ → ¬ s ϕ. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.11. Let Γ ∈MCSχ and let X ∶= {∆ ∈MCSχ ∣ ΓR◯∆}. We have
⊢CS ⋀Γ →◯⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈X}.
Proof. By Lemma 4.9, for all Γ ,∆ ∈MCSχ we have
(not ΓR◯∆) implies ⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬◯⋀∆.
Thus
⊢CS ⋀Γ →⋀{¬◯⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ and not ΓR◯∆},
and hence
⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬⋁{◯⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ and not ΓR◯∆}. (3)
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We also have (cf. [15, Lemma 4.1])
⊢CS ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ}. (4)
By (◯-nec) we get
⊢CS ◯⋁ {⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ}.
By item 7 of Lemma 3.4, we get
⊢CS ⋁{◯⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ}.
Hence
⊢CS ⋀Γ →⋁{◯⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ}.
Therefore
⊢CS ⋀Γ →⋁{◯⋀∆ ∣∆ ∈MCSχ and ΓR◯∆}∨⋁{◯⋀∆ ∣∆ ∈MCSχ and not ΓR◯∆}.
By (3) we infer
⊢CS ⋀Γ →⋁{◯⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ and ΓR◯∆}
and thus
⊢CS ⋀Γ →◯⋁ {⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈ X}. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.12. Let Γ ∈MCSχ and let Y ∶= {∆ ∈MCSχ ∣ ∆R◯Γ}. We have
⊢CS ⋀Γ → w⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈ Y }.
Proof. First note that if Γ is initial, i.e. w  ∈ Γ , then by Lemma 4.7 the set Y is
empty, and moreover we have
⊢CS ⋀Γ → w ,
which implies that
⊢CS ⋀Γ → w ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈ ∅}.
Now suppose Γ is not initial, and thus by Lemma 4.7 there is ∆0 ∈ MCSχ such
that ∆0R◯Γ . By Lemma 4.10, for all Γ ,∆ ∈MCSχ we have
(not ∆R◯Γ ) implies ⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬ s ⋀∆.
Thus
⊢CS ⋀Γ →⋀{¬ s ⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ and not ∆R◯Γ},
and hence
⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬⋁{ s ⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ and not ∆R◯Γ}.
Therefore
⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬⋁{ s ⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ and not ∆R◯Γ and ∆ ≠∆0}. (5)
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From (4) by (w -nec) we get
⊢CS w ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ},
and thus by item 4 of Lemma 3.4 we have
⊢CS ⋁{ s ⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ and ∆ ≠∆0} ∨ w ⋀∆0. (6)
By (5) we infer
⊢CS ⋀Γ →⋁{ s ⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ with ∆R◯Γ and ∆ ≠∆0} ∨ w ⋀∆0
and thus by item 3 of Lemma 3.4
⊢CS ⋀Γ → s ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ with ∆R◯Γ and ∆ ≠∆0} ∨ w ⋀∆0.
Thus, by the axiom (sw), we get
⊢CS ⋀Γ → w ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ with ∆R◯Γ and ∆ ≠∆0} ∨ w ⋀∆0.
Therefore, by item 2 of Lemma 3.4, we get
⊢CS ⋀Γ → w ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈MCSχ with ∆R◯Γ},
and thus
⊢CS ⋀Γ → w ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈ Y }.⊓⊔
Definition 4.13. A finite sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn) of elements of MCSχ is called
a ϕU ψ-sequence starting with Γ if
1. Γ0 = Γ ,
2. ΓjR◯Γj+1, for all 0 ≤ j < n,
3. ψ ∈ Γn,
4. ϕ ∈ Γj, for all 0 ≤ j < n.
Lemma 4.14. For every Γ ∈ MCSχ, if ϕU ψ ∈ Γ , then there exists a ϕU ψ-
sequence starting with Γ .
Proof. Suppose ϕU ψ ∈ Γ and there exists no ϕU ψ-sequence starting with Γ .
Since ϕU ψ ∈ Sub+(χ), we have ϕ,ψ ∈ Sub(χ). We first show that:
¬ψ ∈ Γ and ϕ ∈ Γ. (7)
Suppose ψ ∈ Γ . Then the sequence (Γ ) would be a ϕU ψ-sequence starting with
Γ , contradicting our assumption. Thus ψ /∈ Γ , and hence we get ¬ψ ∈ Γ . On the
other hand, from ϕU ψ ∈ Γ it follows that ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧◯(ϕU ψ)) ∈ Γ . From this we
can immediately deduce by ¬ψ ∈ Γ that ϕ ∈ Γ , and hence ϕ ∈ Γ .
Let TU be the smallest set of elements of MCSχ such that
1. Γ ∈ TU ;
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2. for each Σ ∈ MCSχ, if there is ∆ ∈ TU such that ∆R◯Σ and ϕ ∈ Σ, then
Σ ∈ TU .
First we show that for all Σ ∈ TU such that Σ ≠ Γ and ϕ ∈ Σ there is ∆ ∈ TU such
that ∆R◯Σ. In order to prove this let
T = {Σ ∈ TU ∣ Σ ≠ Γ ,ϕ ∈ Σ, and there is no ∆ ∈ TU such that ∆R◯Σ}.
It is enough to show that T = ∅. If T ≠ ∅, then TU ∖ T is a proper subset of TU
that satisfies properties 1 and 2. This contradicts the fact that TU is the smallest
set with properties 1 and 2.
From the definition of TU and (7) it is not difficult to show that ϕ ∈ Σ for all
Σ ∈ TU . Thus it follows that for all Σ ∈ TU there are Γ0, . . . , Γn ∈ TU , for n ≥ 0,
such that Γ0 = Γ , Γn = Σ, ϕ ∈ Γ0 ∩ . . . ∩ Γn and Γ0R◯ . . . R◯Γn.
Now we claim that for all Σ ∈ TU we have ¬ψ ∈ Σ, and hence ⊢CS ⋀Σ → ¬ψ.
In order to prove the claim first note that, by (7), ¬ψ ∈ Γ . For Σ ∈ TU such
that Σ ≠ Γ , there are Γ0, . . . , Γn ∈ TU , for n > 0, such that Γ0 = Γ , Γn = Σ, ϕ ∈
Γ0 ∩ . . .∩Γn, and Γ0R◯ . . . R◯Γn. Thus ψ /∈ Σ, since otherwise (Γ0, . . . , Γn) would
be a ϕU ψ-sequence starting with Γ , contradicting our assumption. Therefore, by
item 2 of Lemma 4.3, ¬ψ ∈ Σ. This completes the proof of the claim.
Let
ρ ∶= ⋁{⋀∆ ∣ ∆ ∈ TU }.
Using the above claim we get ⊢CS ρ→ ¬ψ.
Let ∆ ∈ TU and Σ ∈ MCSχ such that ∆R◯Σ. We have either ϕ ∈ Σ or ϕ /∈ Σ.
If ϕ ∈ Σ, then by property 2 we have Σ ∈ TU , and hence ⊢CS ⋀Σ → ρ. If ϕ /∈ Σ,
then ¬ϕ ∈ Σ. In addition, ψ /∈ Σ, since otherwise we get a ϕU ψ-sequence starting
with Γ . Thus ¬ψ ∈ Σ, and hence ⊢CS ⋀Σ → ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ.
Thus, for each ∆ ∈ TU and each Σ ∈MCSχ such that ∆R◯Σ, we have
either ⊢CS ⋀Σ → ρ or ⊢CS ⋀Σ → ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ,
and hence,
⊢CS ⋀Σ → ρ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). (8)
By Lemma 4.11, for each ∆ ∈ TU we have
⊢CS ⋀∆→◯(⋀Σ1 ∨ . . . ∨⋀Σn)
such that Σi ∈MCSχ and ∆R◯Σi. By (8), we get
⊢CS ⋀∆ →◯(ρ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)),
for each ∆ ∈ TU . Thus ⊢CS ρ → ◯(ρ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)). Using (U -R), we obtain ⊢CS
ρ → ¬(ϕU ψ). Since Γ ∈ TU , this implies ⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬(ϕU ψ), which contradicts
the assumption ϕU ψ ∈ Γ . ⊓⊔
Definition 4.15. A finite sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn) of elements of MCSχ is called
a ϕS ψ-sequence ending with Γ if
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1. Γn = Γ ,
2. ΓjR◯Γj+1, for all 0 ≤ j < n,
3. ψ ∈ Γ0,
4. ϕ ∈ Γj, for all 0 < j ≤ n.
Lemma 4.16. For every Γ ∈ MCSχ, if ϕS ψ ∈ Γ , then there exists a ϕS ψ-
sequence ending with Γ .
Proof. Suppose ϕS ψ ∈ Γ and there exists no ϕS ψ-sequence ending with Γ . First
note that since ϕS ψ ∈ Sub+(χ), we have either ϕ,ψ ∈ Sub(χ) or ϕ = ⊺ ∈ Aχ and
ψ = w  ∈ Aχ. In either case we have ϕ,ψ ∈ Aχ. From this, similar to the proof of
Lemma 4.14, it is proved that ϕ,¬ψ ∈ Γ .
Let TS be the smallest set of elements of MCSχ such that
1. Γ ∈ TS ;
2. for each ∆ ∈ MCSχ, if there is Σ ∈ TS such that ∆R◯Σ and ϕ ∈ ∆, then
∆ ∈ TS .
Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.14, it is proved that for all ∆ ∈ TS there
is n ≥ 0 and Γ0, . . . , Γn ∈ TS such that Γ0 = ∆, Γn = Γ , and Γ0R◯ . . . R◯Γn.
Moreover, it is not difficult to show that ¬ψ,ϕ ∈∆ for all ∆ ∈ TS .
Let
ρ ∶= ⋁{⋀Σ ∣ Σ ∈ TS }.
We have ⊢CS ρ→ ¬ψ.
Moreover, for each Σ ∈ TS and each ∆ ∈MCSχ with ∆R◯Σ, we have
either ⊢CS ⋀∆→ ρ or ⊢CS ⋀∆ → ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ,
and hence,
⊢CS ⋀∆ → ρ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ). (9)
By Lemma 4.12, for each Σ ∈ TS we have
⊢CS ⋀Σ → w (⋀∆1 ∨ . . . ∨⋀∆n)
such that ∆i ∈MCSχ and ∆iR◯Σ. By (9), we get
⊢CS ⋀Σ → w (ρ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)),
for each Σ ∈ TS . Thus ⊢CS ρ → w (ρ ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)). Using (S -R), we obtain ⊢CS
ρ → ¬(ϕS ψ). Since Γ ∈ TS , this implies ⊢CS ⋀Γ → ¬(ϕS ψ), which contradicts
the assumption ϕS ψ ∈ Γ . ⊓⊔
Definition 4.17. An infinite sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) of elements of MCSχ is called
acceptable (for LCS) if
1. ΓnR◯Γn+1 for all n ≥ 0, and
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2. for all n, if ϕU ψ ∈ Γn, then there exists m ≥ n such that ψ ∈ Γm and ϕ ∈ Γk
for all k with n ≤ k <m.
3. w ∈ Γ0 (i.e. Γ0 is initial).
Lemma 4.18. Every finite sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn) of elements of MCSχ with
w ∈ Γ0 and ΓjR◯Γj+1, for all 0 ≤ j < n, can be extended to an acceptable sequence.
Proof. In order to fulfill the requirements of Definition 4.17, we shall extend the
sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn) by the following steps.
Suppose ϕU ψ ∈ Γ0 and the requirement is not fulfilled for this until formula.
Then either ψ ∈ Γ0 or ¬ψ ∈ Γ0. In the former case the requirement is fulfilled for
the formula ϕU ψ in Γ0, and we go to the next step. In the latter case, using axiom
(U 2), ϕ∧◯(ϕU ψ) ∈ Γ0. Since Γ0R◯Γ 1, by Lemma 4.5, we get ϕU ψ ∈ Γ1. Hence
ϕU ψ ∈ Γ 1.
We can repeat this argument for Γ i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We find that the requirement
for ϕU ψ ∈ Γ0 is either fulfilled in (Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn) or ϕU ψ ∈ Γn and ϕ ∈ Γi for 1 ≤ i ≤
n. In the latter case, by Lemma 4.14, there exists a sequence (Γn, Γn+1, . . . , Γn+m)
such that ϕ ∈ Γi for n ≤ i < n +m, ψ ∈ Γn+m, and ΓiR◯Γi+1 for n ≤ i < n +m.
This gives a finite extension of the original sequence that satisfies the requirement
imposed by ϕU ψ ∈ Γ0.
In the next step we repeat this argument for the remaining until formulas at
Γ0. Eventually we obtain a finite sequence that satisfies all requirements imposed
by until formulas at Γ0.
We may move on to Γ 1 and apply the same procedure. It is clear that by
iterating the above argument to all until formulas of all elements Γi of the sequence
(Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn, . . .), including until formulas of new elements Γi for i > n, we obtain
in the limit a (finite or infinite) sequence that extends (Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn) and satisfies
conditions 1–3 of Definition 4.17. If the resulting sequence if finite, then by seriality
of R◯ it can be extended to an infinite sequence, and in each step of this extension
we can repeat the above argument to fulfill the obligations arising from the until
formulas. Thus, we finally get an acceptable sequence that extends (Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn).
⊓⊔
Corollary 4.19. For every Γ ∈MCSχ, there is an acceptable sequence containing
Γ .
Proof. Since xw  = ⊺S w  ∈ Γ , by Lemma 4.16, there exists a ⊺S w -sequence
(Γ0, Γ1, . . . , Γn) ending with Γ , i.e. Γn = Γ , ΓjR◯Γj+1, for all 0 ≤ j < n, and
w  ∈ Γ0. By Lemma 4.18, this sequence can be extended to an acceptable sequence.
⊓⊔
Lemma 4.20. Let (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) be an acceptable sequence of elements of MCSχ
and let n ≥ 0.
1. s nw ∈ Γn, where s n is the iteration of s , n times. 1
1 As it will be explained in Remark 5.6, s nw  expresses the property “the time is n.”
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2. ϕS ψ ∈ Γn iff there exists m ≤ n such that ψ ∈ Γm and ϕ ∈ Γk for all k with
m < k ≤ n.
3. If ϕS ψ ∈ Sub+(χ) then we have ϕS ψ ∈ Γn iff there exists m ≤ n such that
ψ ∈ Γm and ϕ ∈ Γk for all k with m < k ≤ n.
Proof. 1. By induction on n.
2. Suppose ϕS ψ ∈ Γn. The proof involves a routine induction on n. If n = 0, then
using axiom (S 2) we have either ψ ∈ Γ0 or ϕ ∧ s (ϕS ψ) ∈ Γ0. In the former
case, we are done. By Lemma 4.8 the latter case cannot happen. If n > 0, then
using axiom (S 2) we have either ψ ∈ Γn or ϕ ∧ s (ϕS ψ) ∈ Γn. In the former
case, we are done. In the latter case, we have ϕ ∈ Γn, and by Lemma 4.5 we
get ϕS ψ ∈ Γn−1. By the induction hypothesis there exists m ≤ n − 1 such that
ψ ∈ Γm and ϕ ∈ Γk for all k with m < k ≤ n−1. This completes the proof of the
only if direction. The proof of the reverse implication is similar.
3. Follows from item 2. ⊓⊔
5 Semantics of LPLTLP
In this section we introduce interpreted systems based on Fitting-models as se-
mantics for temporal justification logic LPLTLP.
Definition 5.1. A frame is a tuple (S,R1, . . . ,Rh) where
1. S is a non-empty set of states;
2. each Ri ⊆ S × S is a reflexive and transitive relation.
A run r on a frame is a function from N to states, i.e., r ∶ N → S. A system R is
a non-empty set of runs.
Given a run r and n ∈ N, the pair (r,n) is called a point.
Definition 5.2. Given a frame (S,R1, . . . ,Rh), a CS-evidence function for agent i
is a function
Ei ∶ S ×Tm→ ℘(Fml)
satisfying the following conditions. For all terms s, t ∈ Tm, all formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml,
all v,w ∈ S, and all i ∈ Ag:
1. Ei(v, t) ⊆ Ei(w, t), whenever Ri(v,w); (monotonicity)
2. if [t]iϕ ∈ CS, then ϕ ∈ Ei(w, t); (constant specification)
3. if ϕ→ ψ ∈ Ei(w, t) and ϕ ∈ Ei(w,s), then ψ ∈ Ei(w, t ⋅ s); (application)
4. Ei(w,s) ∪ Ei(w, t) ⊆ Ei(w,s + t); (sum)
5. if ϕ ∈ Ei(w, t), then [t]iϕ ∈ Ei(w, !t). (positive introspection)
Definition 5.3. An interpreted system for LPLTLPCS (or for CS) is a tuple
I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν)
where
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1. (S,R1, . . . ,Rh) is a frame;
2. R is a system on that frame;
3. Ei is a CS-evidence function for agent i for 1 ≤ i ≤ h;
4. ν ∶ S → ℘(Prop) is a valuation.
Definition 5.4. Given an interpreted system
I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν),
a run r ∈ R, and n ∈ N, we define truth of a formula ϕ in I at point (r,n)
inductively by
(I, r, n) ⊧ P iff P ∈ ν(r(n)) ,
(I, r, n) /⊧  ,
(I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ→ ψ iff (I, r, n) /⊧ ϕ or (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ ,
(I, r, n) ⊧ wϕ iff n = 0 or (I, r, n − 1) ⊧ ϕ ,
(I, r, n) ⊧◯ϕ iff (I, r, n + 1) ⊧ ϕ ,
(I, r, n) ⊧ ϕS ψ iff there is some m ≤ n such that (I, r,m) ⊧ ψ
and (I, r, k) ⊧ ϕ for all k with m < k ≤ n ,
(I, r, n) ⊧ ϕU ψ iff there is some m ≥ n such that (I, r,m) ⊧ ψ
and (I, r, k) ⊧ ϕ for all k with n ≤ k <m,
(I, r, n) ⊧ [t]iϕ iff ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t) and (I, r′, n′) ⊧ ϕ
for all r′ ∈ R and n′ ∈ N such that Ri(r(n), r′(n′)) .
As usual, we write I ⊧ ϕ if for all r ∈ R and all n ∈ N, we have (I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ.
Further, we write ⊧CS ϕ if I ⊧ ϕ for all interpreted systems I for CS.
Definition 5.5. Given a set of formulas Γ and a formula ϕ, the (local) con-
sequence relation is defined as follows: Γ ⊧CS ϕ iff for all interpreted systems
I = (R, . . .) for CS, for all r ∈ R, and for all n ∈ N, if (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ ,
then (I, r, n) ⊧ ϕ.
From the above definitions it follows that:
(I, r, n) ⊧◇ϕ iff (I, r,m) ⊧ ϕ for some m ≥ n ,
(I, r, n) ⊧ ◻ϕ iff (I, r,m) ⊧ ϕ for all m ≥ n ,
(I, r, n) ⊧xϕ iff (I, r,m) ⊧ ϕ for some m ≤ n ,
(I, r, n) ⊧ ⊟ϕ iff (I, r,m) ⊧ ϕ for all m ≤ n ,
(I, r, n) ⊧ s ϕ iff n > 0 and (I, r, n − 1) ⊧ ϕ .
It is sometime convenient to use the following truth conditions for since and
until formulas, which are clearly equivalent to the corresponding conditions given
in Definition 5.4.
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(I, r, n) ⊧ ϕS ψ iff there is some m with n ≥m ≥ 0 such that (I, r, n −m) ⊧ ψ
and (I, r, n − k) ⊧ ϕ for all k with 0 ≤ k <m
(I, r, n) ⊧ ϕU ψ iff there is some m ≥ 0 such that (I, r, n +m) ⊧ ψ
and (I, r, n + k) ⊧ ϕ for all k with 0 ≤ k <m.
Remark 5.6. Note that
(I, r, n) ⊧ w  iff n = 0.
Thus w  expresses the property “the time is 0.” Similarly, s mw , where s m is
the iteration of s , m times, expresses the property “the time is m.”
Let “time =m” abbreviate s mw  and truem(ϕ) abbreviate time =m → ϕ.
It is easy to show that
(I, r, n) ⊧ time =m iff n =m
and
I ⊧ truem(ϕ) iff I, r,m ⊧ ϕ for all r ∈ R.
Thus, truem(ϕ) expresses that “ϕ is true at time m.”
Remark 5.7. The interpreted systems are originally formulated by means of the
notions of local and global states (see e.g. [8, 15]). Now I aim to define the inter-
preted systems for LPLTLP, using the notions of local and global states, so that it
more closely matches the original definition of interpreted systems given in [8].
Suppose that at any point in time the system is in some global state, defined
by the local states of the agents and the state of other objects of interest (which is
refered to as the “environment”). Let L be some set of local states. Informally, an
agent’s local state captures all the information available to her at a given moment
of time. A global state is a (h + 1)-tuple ⟨le, l1, . . . , lh⟩ ∈ Lh+1, where le is the state
of environment and li is the local state of agent i for i = 1, . . . , h. Now in order
to define the interpreted systems for LPLTLP using the notions of local and global
states, it is enough to put the set of states S ∶= Lh+1. As before a run r is a
function from time to global states, i.e., r ∶ N → Lh+1, and a system is a set R of
runs. The definitions of CS-evidence functions, interpreted systems, and truth are
as before. Note that here ⟨le, l1, . . . , lh⟩Ri⟨l′e, l
′
1, . . . , l
′
h⟩ means “the local state l
′
i is
epistemically possible for agent i in the local state li.”
It is worth noting that the semantics given by Bucheli in [5] for temporal justi-
fication logic employs global states. However, there is a minor difference between
Bucheli’s semantics and ours. Since he modeled the knowledge part of the tem-
poral justification logic by a justification counterpart of the modal logic S5, he
defines indistinguishability relations ∼i between points, for each agent i, which are
clearly equivalence relations. In contrast to his formulation, our temporal justifi-
cation logic is based on a justification counterpart of the modal logic S4, and thus
we naturally make use of reflexive and transitive accessibility relations Ri for each
agent i.
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6 Soundness and Completeness of LPLTLP
The soundness proof for LPLTLPCS is a straightforward combination of the sound-
ness proofs for temporal logic and justification logic by induction on the derivation.
Theorem 6.1 (Soundness). For each formula ϕ and finite set of formulas Γ ,
Γ ⊢CS ϕ implies Γ ⊧CS ϕ.
Definition 6.2. The χ-canonical interpreted system
I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν)
for CS is defined as follows:
1. R consists of all mappings r ∶ N → MCSχ such that (r(0), r(1), . . .) is an
acceptable sequence;
2. S ∶=MCSχ = {r(n) ∣ r ∈ R, n ∈ N};
3. Ri(Γ,∆) iff {ϕ ∣ [t]iϕ ∈ Γ for some t} ⊆∆;
4. Ei(Γ, t) ∶= {ϕ ∣ [t]iϕ ∈ Γ};
5. ν(Γ ) ∶= {P ∈ Prop ∣ P ∈ Γ}.
Lemma 6.3. The χ-canonical interpreted system
I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν)
for CS is an interpreted system for CS.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the corresponding proof for single agent
Fitting-models in [9]. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6.4 (Truth Lemma). Let I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν) be the χ-
canonical interpreted system for CS. For every formula ψ ∈ Sub+(χ), every run r
in R, and every n ∈ N we have:
(I, r, n) ⊧ ψ iff ψ ∈ r(n).
Proof. As usual, the proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. Let r(n) = Γn,
for n ≥ 0. We show only the following cases:
– ψ = [t]iϕ.
(⇒) If (I, r, n) ⊧ [t]iϕ, then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t). Thus, by definition, [t]iϕ ∈ Γn,
and hence [t]iϕ ∈ r(n) = Γn.
(⇐) If [t]iϕ ∈ r(n), then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t). Now suppose that Ri(r(n), r′(n′))
and let r′(n′) = ∆n′ . We find ϕ ∈ ∆n′ . By the induction hypothesis we get
(I, r′, n′) ⊧ ϕ. Since r′ and n′ were arbitrary, we conclude (I, r, n) ⊧ [t]iϕ.
– ψ =◯ϕ.
(⇒) Suppose that (I, r, n) ⊧ ◯ϕ and ◯ϕ /∈ r(n). Then (I, r, n + 1) ⊧ ϕ, and
hence by the induction hypothesis ϕ ∈ r(n + 1). On the other hand, ¬◯ϕ ∈
r(n). Since r(n)R◯r(n + 1), by Lemma 4.5, we get ¬ϕ ∈ r(n + 1), which is a
contradiction.
(⇐) If◯ϕ ∈ r(n), then ϕ ∈ r(n+1). By the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n+1) ⊧
ϕ, and hence (I, r, n) ⊧◯ϕ.
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– ψ = ψ1 U ψ2.
(⇒) If (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ1 U ψ2, then (I, r,m) ⊧ ψ2 for somem ≥ n, and (I, r, k) ⊧ ψ1
for all k with n ≤ k < m. By the induction hypothesis we get ψ2 ∈ r(m), and
ψ1 ∈ r(k) for all k with n ≤ k < m. We have to show ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ r(n), which
follows by induction on m as follows:
● Base case m = n. Since ψ2 ∈ r(n) = r(m) and ⊢CS ψ2 → (ψ1 U ψ2), by item
4 of Lemma 4.3, we obtain ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ r(n).
● Suppose m > n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ1 U ψ2 ∈
r(n + 1), and hence ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Γn+1. Thus ◯(ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ Γn. Now suppose
towards a contradiction that ψ1 U ψ2 /∈ Γn. Hence ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ Γn. By
axiom (U 2),
⊢CS ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) → [¬ψ2 ∧ (¬ψ1 ∨ ¬◯(ψ1 U ψ2))],
and thus
⊢CS ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) ∧ψ1 → ¬◯(ψ1 U ψ2),
Thus, ¬◯(ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ Γn, which is a contradiction. Thus, ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Γn and
hence ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ r(n).
(⇐) If ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ r(n), then since (r(n), r(n+1), . . .) is an acceptable sequence
there exists m ≥ n such that ψ2 ∈ r(m), and ψ1 ∈ r(k) for all k with n ≤ k <m.
By the induction hypothesis we obtain (I, r,m) ⊧ ψ2, and (I, r, k) ⊧ ψ1 for all
k with n ≤ k <m. Thus (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ1 U ψ2.
– ψ = ψ1 S ψ2.
(⇒) If (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ1 S ψ2, then (I, r,m) ⊧ ψ2 for somem ≤ n, and (I, r, k) ⊧ ψ1
for all k with m < k ≤ n. By the induction hypothesis, ψ2 ∈ r(m), and ψ1 ∈ r(k)
for all k with m < k ≤ n. We want to show that ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ r(n). We prove it by
induction on m as follows.
● Base case m = n. Since ψ2 ∈ r(n) = r(m) and ⊢CS ψ2 → (ψ1 S ψ2), we
obtain ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ r(n).
● Suppose m < n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ1 S ψ2 ∈
r(n− 1), and hence ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn−1. Thus, by Lemma 4.5, s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn.
Now suppose towards a contradiction that ψ1 S ψ2 /∈ Γn. Hence ¬(ψ1 S ψ2) ∈
Γn. By axiom (S 2),
⊢CS ¬(ψ1 S ψ2) → [¬ψ2 ∧ (¬ψ1 ∨ ¬ s (ψ1 S ψ2))],
and thus
⊢CS ¬(ψ1 S ψ2) ∧ ψ1 → ¬ s (ψ1 S ψ2),
Thus, ¬ s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn, which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ r(n), then ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn. Thus either ψ2 ∈ Γn or ψ1 ∧
s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn. In the former case, ψ2 ∈ r(n) and by the induction hy-
pothesis, (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ2, and thus (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ1 S ψ2 as desired. In the
latter case, ψ1 ∈ r(n) and by the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ1.
From s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn, by Lemma 4.5, we have ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn−1. Again from
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ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn−1 it follows that either ψ2 ∈ Γn−1 or ψ1 ∧ s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn−1.
In the former case, by the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n−1) ⊧ ψ2, and thus
(I, r, n) ⊧ ψ1 S ψ2 as desired. In the latter case, by the induction hypothe-
sis, (I, r, n−1) ⊧ ψ1, and by Lemma 4.5 we have ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn−2. By repeat-
ing this argument, we finally get either ψ2 ∈ Γ0 or ψ1 ∧ s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γ0.
By Lemma 4.8 the latter case is impossible. In the former case, by the
induction hypothesis, (I, r,0) ⊧ ψ2, and thus (I, r, n) ⊧ ψ1 S ψ2 as desired.
– ψ = w ϕ.
(⇒) Suppose that (I, r, n) ⊧ w ϕ and w ϕ /∈ r(n). Then n = 0 or (I, r, n−1) ⊧ ϕ.
● Suppose n = 0. Thus w ϕ /∈ Γ0. Since ⊺S w  is an axiom, we have ⊺S w  ∈
Γ0. Thus w  ∈ Γ0 or ⊺ ∧ s (⊺S w ) ∈ Γ0. By Lemma 4.8, the latter case
is impossible, and thus we get w  ∈ Γ0. Since ⊢CS w  → w ϕ, we get
w ϕ ∈ Γ0, which is a contradiction.
● Suppose n > 0 and (I, r, n − 1) ⊧ ϕ. Hence by the induction hypothesis
ϕ ∈ r(n − 1), and thus ϕ ∈ Γn−1. Thus, by the axiom (FP), ◯ s ϕ ∈ Γn−1.
Hence, by Lemma 4.5, s ϕ ∈ Γn. On the other hand, from w ϕ /∈ Γn and
axiom (sw) we get s ϕ /∈ Γn, which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If w ϕ ∈ r(n), then w ϕ ∈ Γn. In addition if n > 0, then by Lemma 4.5,
we get ϕ ∈ Γn−1. By the induction hypothesis, (I, r, n − 1) ⊧ ϕ, and hence
(I, r, n) ⊧ w ϕ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6.5 (Completeness). For each formula ϕ,
⊧CS ϕ implies ⊢CS ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that /⊢CS ϕ. Thus, {¬ϕ} is a CS-consistent set. Therefore, there
exists Γ ∈ MCS with ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Let Γ = Γ ∩ Sub+(ϕ). By Corollary 4.19, there is an
acceptable sequence containing Γ , say (Γ0, Γ1 . . . , Γn, Γn+1, . . .) where n ≥ 0 and
Γn = Γ . In the ϕ-canonical model I for CS define the run r as follows r(i) ∶= Γi.
Since ϕ /∈ Γn, by the Truth Lemma, (I, r, n) /⊧ ϕ. Therefore, /⊧CS ϕ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6.6 (Completeness). For each formula ϕ and finite set of formulas
Γ ,
Γ ⊧CS ϕ implies Γ ⊢CS ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that Γ /⊢CS ϕ. Thus, /⊢CS ⋀Γ → ϕ. By Theorem 6.5, there is an
interpreted system I = (R, . . .), r ∈ R, and n ∈ N such that (I, r, n) ⊧ ⋀Γ and
(I, r, n) /⊧ ϕ. Therefore, Γ /⊧CS ϕ. ⊓⊔
7 Another semantics for LPLTLP
In this section we present another semantics based on Mkrtychev models [21] for
LPLTL
P. These models are indeed the interpreted systems with singleton system
of runs.
Definition 7.1. An LPLTLPCS-model is a tuple M= (r,S,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν) where
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1. S is a non-empty set of states;
2. r ∶ N → S is a run on S;
3. Ei is a CS-evidence function for agent i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ h, that satisfies conditions
2–5 of Definition 5.2;
4. ν ∶ S → ℘(Prop) is a valuation.
Given an LPLTLPCS-model M= (r,S,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν) and n ∈ N, we define truth of
a formula ϕ in M at state r(n) inductively by
(M, r(n)) ⊧ P iff P ∈ ν(r(n)) ,
(M, r(n)) /⊧  ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ→ ψ iff (M, r(n)) /⊧ ϕ or (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ w ϕ iff n = 0 or (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ϕ ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧◯ϕ iff (M, r(n + 1)) ⊧ ϕ ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕS ψ iff there is some m ≤ n such that (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ
and (M, r(k)) ⊧ ϕ for all k with m < k ≤ n ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕU ψ iff there is some m ≥ n such that (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ
and (M, r(k)) ⊧ ϕ for all k with n ≤ k <m,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ [t]iϕ iff ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t) and (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ.
We write M ⊧ ϕ if (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ for all n ∈ N.
From the above definitions it follows that:
(M, r(n)) ⊧◇ϕ iff (M, r(m)) ⊧ ϕ for some m ≥ n ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ ◻ϕ iff (M, r(m)) ⊧ ϕ for all m ≥ n ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧xϕ iff (M, r(m)) ⊧ ϕ for some m ≤ n ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ ⊟ϕ iff (M, r(m)) ⊧ ϕ for all m ≤ n ,
(M, r(n)) ⊧ s ϕ iff n > 0 and (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ϕ ,
Definition 7.2. Given a set of formulas Γ and a formula ϕ, the (local) conse-
quence relation is defined as follows: Γ ⊩CS ϕ iff for all LPLTL
P
CS-models M =
(r, . . .), and for all n ∈ N, if (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ , then (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ.
Remark 7.3. As in Remark 5.6, if we let “time = m” abbreviate s mw  and
truem(ϕ) abbreviate time =m → ϕ, then we have
M ⊧ truem(ϕ) iff M,m ⊧ ϕ.
Theorem 7.4 (Soundness). For each formula ϕ and finite set of formulas Γ ,
Γ ⊢CS ϕ implies Γ ⊩CS ϕ.
Definition 7.5. Given an acceptable sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) for LPLTLPCS, where
each Γi is in MCSχ, the χ-canonical model M = (r,S,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) for CS with
respect to (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) is defined as follows:
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1. S ∶= {Γ0, Γ1, . . .}.
2. r(n) ∶= Γn, for all n ∈ N.
3. Ei(Γn, t) ∶= {ϕ ∣ [t]iϕ ∈ Γn}.
4. ν(Γn) ∶= {P ∈ Prop ∣ P ∈ Γn}.
Lemma 7.6. The χ-canonical model M = (r,S,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) for CS with respect
to an acceptable sequence (Γ0, Γ 1, . . .) is an LPLTLPCS-model.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.3. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7.7 (Truth Lemma). Let M = (r,S,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) be the χ-canonical
model for CS with respect to an acceptable sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . .). For every formula
ψ ∈ Sub+(χ), and every n ∈ N we have:
(M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ iff ψ ∈ Γn.
Proof. As usual, the proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. We show only
the following cases:
– ψ = [t]iϕ.
(⇒) If (M, r(n)) ⊧ [t]iϕ, then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t). Thus, ϕ ∈ Ei(Γn, t), and hence
[t]iϕ ∈ Γn.
(⇐) If [t]iϕ ∈ Γn, then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t). By (reflexivity), ϕ ∈ Γn and by the
induction hypothesis we get (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ. We conclude (M, r(n)) ⊧ [t]iϕ.
– ψ =◯ϕ.
(M, r(n)) ⊧◯ϕ iff (M, r(n+1)) ⊧ ϕ, by the induction hypothesis, iff ϕ ∈ Γn+1,
by ΓnR◯Γn+1 and Lemma 4.5, iff ◯ϕ ∈ Γn.
– ψ = ψ1 U ψ2.
(⇒) If (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ1 U ψ2, then (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ2 for some m ≥ n, and
(M, r(k)) ⊧ ψ1 for all k with n ≤ k <m. By the induction hypothesis, ψ2 ∈ Γm,
and ψ1 ∈ Γk for all k with n ≤ k <m. We want to show that ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Γn. We
prove it by induction on m as follows.
● Base case m = n. Since ψ2 ∈ Γn and ⊢ ψ2 → (ψ1 U ψ2), we obtain ψ1 U ψ2 ∈
Γn.
● Suppose m > n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ1 U ψ2 ∈
Γn+1, and hence ◯(ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ Γn. Now suppose towards a contradiction
that ψ1 U ψ2 /∈ Γn. Hence ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ Γn. By axiom (U 2),
⊢ ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) → [¬ψ2 ∧ (¬ψ1 ∨ ¬◯(ψ1 U ψ2))],
and thus
⊢ ¬(ψ1 U ψ2) ∧ψ1 → ¬◯(ψ1 U ψ2),
Thus, ¬◯(ψ1 U ψ2) ∈ Γn, which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If ψ1 U ψ2 ∈ Γn, then since (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) is an acceptable sequence there
exists m ≥ n such that ψ2 ∈ Γm, and ψ1 ∈ Γk for all k with n ≤ k < m. By
the induction hypothesis, (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ2, and (M, r(k)) ⊧ ψ1 for all k
with n ≤ k <m. Thus (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ1 U ψ2.
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– ψ = ψ1 S ψ2.
(⇒) If (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ1 S ψ2, then (M, r(m)) ⊧ ψ2 for some m ≤ n, and
(M, r(k)) ⊧ ψ1 for all k with m < k ≤ n. By the induction hypothesis, ψ2 ∈ Γm,
and ψ1 ∈ Γk for all k with m < k ≤ n. We want to show that ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn. We
prove it by induction on m as follows.
● Base case m = n. Since ψ2 ∈ Γn and ⊢ ψ2 → (ψ1 S ψ2), we obtain ψ1 S ψ2 ∈
Γn.
● Suppose m < n. It follows from the induction hypothesis that ψ1 S ψ2 ∈
Γn−1, and hence s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn. Now suppose towards a contradiction
that ψ1 S ψ2 /∈ Γn. Hence ¬(ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn. We get
⊢ ¬(ψ1 S ψ2) → [¬ψ2 ∧ (¬ψ1 ∨ ¬ s (ψ1 S ψ2))],
and thus
⊢ ¬(ψ1 S ψ2) ∧ψ1 → ¬ s (ψ1 S ψ2),
Thus, ¬ s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn, which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn, then either ψ2 ∈ Γn or ψ1∧ s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn. In the former
case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ2, and thus (M, r(n)) ⊧
ψ1 S ψ2 as desired. In the latter case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n)) ⊧
ψ1. From s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γn, by Lemma 4.5, we have ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn−1. Again
from ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn−1 it follows that either ψ2 ∈ Γn−1 or ψ1 ∧ s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈
Γn−1. In the former case, by the induction hypothesis, (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ψ2,
and thus (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ1 S ψ2 as desired. In the latter case, by the induction
hypothesis, (M, r(n−1)) ⊧ ψ1, and by Lemma 4.5 we have ψ1 S ψ2 ∈ Γn−2. By
repeating this argument, we finally get either ψ2 ∈ Γ0 or ψ1 ∧ s (ψ1 S ψ2) ∈ Γ0.
By Lemma 4.8 the latter case is impossible. In the former case, by the induction
hypothesis, (M, r(0)) ⊧ ψ2, and thus (M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ1 S ψ2 as desired.
– ψ = w ϕ.
(⇒) Suppose that (M, r(n)) ⊧ w ϕ and w ϕ /∈ Γn. Then n = 0 or (M, r(n −
1)) ⊧ ϕ.
● Suppose n = 0. Since ⊺S w  is an axiom, we have ⊺S w  ∈ Γ0. Thus w  ∈ Γ0
or ⊺∧ s (⊺S w ) ∈ Γ0. Since, by Lemma 4.8, the latter case is impossible, we
get w  ∈ Γ0. Since ⊢ w → w ϕ, we get w ϕ ∈ Γ0, which is a contradiction.
● Suppose n > 0 and (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ϕ. Hence by the induction hypothesis
ϕ ∈ Γn−1. Thus, by the axiom (FP), ◯ s ϕ ∈ Γn−1. Hence, by Lemma 4.5,
s ϕ ∈ Γn. On the other hand, from w ϕ /∈ Γn and axiom (sw) we get
s ϕ /∈ Γn, which is a contradiction.
(⇐) If w ϕ ∈ Γn and n > 0, then by Lemma 4.5, we get ϕ ∈ Γn−1. By the
induction hypothesis, (M, r(n − 1)) ⊧ ϕ, and hence (M, r(n)) ⊧ w ϕ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7.8 (Completeness). If M ⊧ ϕ for all LPLTLPCS-models M, then
⊢CS ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that LPLTLPCS /⊢ ϕ. Thus, {¬ϕ} is a CS-consistent set. Therefore,
there exists Γ ∈MCS with ¬ϕ ∈ Γ . Let Γ = Γ ∩Sub+(ϕ). By Corollary 4.19, there is
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an acceptable sequence containing Γ , say (Γ0, Γ1 . . . , Γn, Γn+1, . . .) where n ≥ 0 and
Γn = Γ . Construct the ϕ-canonical modelM for CS with respect to this acceptable
sequence. Since ϕ /∈ Γn, by the Truth Lemma, (M, r(n)) /⊧ ϕ. Therefore, M /⊧ ϕ.
⊓⊔
Theorem 7.9 (Completeness). For each formula ϕ and finite set of formulas
Γ ,
Γ ⊩CS ϕ implies Γ ⊢CS ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that Γ /⊢CS ϕ. Thus, /⊢CS ⋀Γ → ϕ. By Theorem 7.8, there is
an LPLTLPCS-model M = (r, . . .), and n ∈ N such that (M, r(n)) ⊧ ⋀Γ and
(M, r(n)) /⊧ ϕ. Therefore, Γ /⊩CS ϕ. ⊓⊔
8 Connecting principles
In LPLTLPCS, epistemic and temporal properties do not interact. In this section we
study some principles that create a connection between justifications and temporal
modalities. We assume the language for terms to be augmented in the obvious way.
1. ◻ [t]iϕ→ [⇑ t]i ◻ϕ (generalize)
2. [t]i ◻ϕ→ ◻ [⇓ t]iϕ (◻-access)
3. [t]i ◻ϕ→ [↓ t]i◯ϕ (◯-access)
4. [t]i◯ϕ→◯ [⇛ t]iϕ (◯-right)
5. ◯ [t]iϕ→ [⇚ t]i◯ϕ (◯-left)
6. ⊟ [t]iϕ→ [⇑P t]i ⊟ ϕ (⊟-generalize)
7. [t]i ⊟ϕ→ ⊟ [⇓P t]iϕ (⊟-access)
8. [t]i ⊟ϕ→ [↓P t]iw ϕ (w -access)
9. [t]iw ϕ→ w [⇒P t]iϕ (w -right)
10. [t]i s ϕ→ s [⇛P t]iϕ ( s -right)
11. s [t]iϕ→ [⇚P t]i s ϕ ( s -left)
Principles 1–5 were first proposed by Bucheli in [5] from which the name of the
axioms are also taken.2 A few remarks on these principles are in order:
(generalize) This principle says that if you have a fixed piece of evidence that
always supports a proposition, then you have evidence that this proposition is
always true. The term operator ⇑ converts permanent evidence for a proposi-
tion to evidence for knowing that this proposition is always true.
(◻-access) This principle says that if you have evidence that a proposition is
always true, then at every point in time you are able to access this information.
The term operator ⇓ makes the evidence accessible in every future point in
time. This principle is a counterpart of the axiom Ki◻ϕ→ ◻Kiϕ in the logics
of knowledge and time, which is valid in the interpreted systems with perfect
recall (where an agent retains the knowledge of previous times), but does not
characterize it, see [15].
2 The principle [t]i◯ϕ→◯[⇛ t]iϕ is called (◯-access) in [6].
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(◯-access) This principle is similar to the valid formula ◻ϕ → ◯ϕ augmented
by justifications. In fact, if you have evidence that a proposition is always
true, then you have evidence that it is true tomorrow, and the term operator
↓ constructs such an evidence.
(◯-right) This principle says that agents do not forget evidence once they have
gathered it and can “take it with them”. The term operator⇛ carries evidence
through time. This principle is a counterpart of the axiom Ki◯ϕ→◯Kiϕ in
the logics of knowledge and time, which characterizes the synchronous systems
(where each agent always knows the time) with perfect recall, see [15].
(◯-left) This principle implies some form of conditional prediction. The term op-
erator⇚ predicts future evidence for knowledge. This principle is a counterpart
of the axiom◯Kiϕ→Ki◯ϕ in the logics of knowledge and time, which charac-
terizes the synchronous systems with no learning (where an agent’s knowledge
can not increase over time), see [15].
The connecting principles involving past operators are the dual of those involv-
ing future operators, and thus the meaning of the term operators with subscript
P can be guessed straightforwardly.
Given a logic L and a set of axioms Ax, by L(Ax) we denote the result of
adding axioms from Ax to logic L. In the rest of this section Ax is an arbitrary
set of the above connecting principles, i.e.
Ax ⊆ {(generalize), (◻-access), (◯-access), (◯-right), (◯-left), (⊟-generalize),
(⊟-access), (w -access), (w -right), ( s -right), ( s -left)}.
In the following sections we introduce new axioms and allow Ax to include the
new axioms as well.
Let us show that a version of (◯-access) is derivable from (◻-access) and
(◯-left).
Lemma 8.1. Let Ax contains axioms (◻-access) and (◯-left). For every agent i,
formula ϕ and term t there is a term s(t) such that
⊢
LPLTL
P(Ax)∅
[t]i ◻ϕ→ [s(t)]i◯ϕ.
Proof. Construct the following proof in LPLTLP(Ax)∅ where Ax contains axioms
(◻-access) and (◯-left).
1. [t]i ◻ϕ→ ◻ [⇓ t]iϕ, instance of axiom (◻-access)
2. ◻ [⇓ t]iϕ→◯ [⇓ t]iϕ, Lemma 3.3 item 2
3. ◯ [⇓ t]iϕ→ [⇚⇓ t]i◯ϕ, instance of axiom (◯-left)
4. [t]i ◻ϕ→ [⇚⇓ t]i◯ϕ. from 1–3 by propositional reasoning
Finally put s(t) ∶=⇚⇓ t. ⊓⊔
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8.1 Semantics
Now we present a semantics for LPLTLP(Ax) based on Mkrtychev models. In the
next section these models will be extended to interpreted systems.
Definition 8.2. Let CS be a constant specification for LPLTLP(Ax). An
LPLTLP(Ax)CS-model is a tuple M = (r,S,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν) where S is a non-empty
set of states, r is a run on S, ν is a valuation, and the CS-evidence functions
E1 . . . ,Eh should satisfy conditions 2–5 of Definition 5.2 and the following condi-
tions depending on axioms in Ax. For all n ∈ N, all terms s, t ∈ Tm, all formulas
ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, and all i ∈ Ag:
1. if ϕ ∈ Ei(r(m), t) for all m ≥ n, then ◻ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n),⇑ t). (generalize-E)
2. if ◻ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t), then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(m),⇓ t) for all m ≥ n. (◻-access-E)
3. if ◻ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t), then ◯ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), ↓ t). (◯-access-E)
4. if ◯ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t), then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n + 1),⇛ t). (◯-right-E)
5. if ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n + 1), t), then ◯ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n),⇚ t). (◯-left-E)
6. if ϕ ∈ Ei(r(m), t) for all m ≤ n, then ⊟ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n),⇑P t). (⊟-generalize-E)
7. if ⊟ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t), then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(m),⇓P t) for all m ≤ n. (⊟-access-E)
8. if ⊟ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t), then wϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), ↓P t). (w-access-E)
9. wϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t) and n > 0, then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n − 1),⇒P t). (w-right-E)
10. sϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t) and n > 0, then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n − 1),⇛P t). ( s -right-E)
11. ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n − 1), t), then sϕ ∈ Ei(r(n),⇚P t). ( s -left-E)
Lemma 8.3. Let (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) be an acceptable sequence of elements of MCSχ.
1. If ◻ϕ ∈ Γn, then ϕ ∈ Γm for all m ≥ n.
2. If ◇ϕ ∈ Γn, then ϕ ∈ Γm for some m ≥ n.
3. If xϕ ∈ Γn, then ϕ ∈ Γm for some m ≤ n.
4. ⊟ϕ ∈ Γn iff ϕ ∈ Γm for all m ≤ n.
Proof. 1. Suppose ◻ϕ ∈ Γn and there is m ≥ n such that ϕ /∈ Γm. If m = n, then
by Lemma 3.3 we get ϕ ∈ Γn, which is a contradiction. Now suppose m > n.
Then, by Lemma 3.3, ◯◻ϕ ∈ Γn. By Lemma 4.5, ◻ϕ ∈ Γn+1. By repeating the
argument, we get ◻ϕ ∈ Γm, and hence ϕ ∈ Γm which is a contradiction.
2. Suppose ◇ϕ ∈ Γn. Then ⊺U ϕ ∈ Γn. Since (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) is an acceptable se-
quence, there exists m ≥ n such that ϕ ∈ Γm.
3. Suppose xϕ ∈ Γn. Then ⊺S ϕ ∈ Γn. Then either ϕ ∈ Γn or ⊺ ∧ s (⊺S ϕ) ∈
Γn. In the former case, we are done. In the latter case, by Lemma 4.5 we
have ⊺S ϕ ∈ Γn−1. Again from ⊺S ϕ ∈ Γn−1 it follows that either ϕ ∈ Γn−1 or
⊺ ∧ s (⊺S ϕ) ∈ Γn−1. In the former case, we are done. In the latter case, by
Lemma 4.5 we have ⊺S ϕ ∈ Γn−2. By repeating this argument, we finally get
either ϕ ∈ Γ0 or s (⊺S ϕ) ∈ Γ0. In the former case, we are done. In the latter
case, by Lemma 4.8, we get a contradiction since Γ0 is initial.
4. Suppose ⊟ϕ ∈ Γn and there is m ≤ n such that ϕ /∈ Γm. If m = n, then by
Lemma 3.3 we get ϕ ∈ Γn, which is a contradiction. Now suppose m < n.
Then, by Lemma 3.3, w ⊟ϕ ∈ Γn. By Lemma 4.5, ⊟ϕ ∈ Γn−1. By repeating the
argument, we get ⊟ϕ ∈ Γm, and hence ϕ ∈ Γm which is a contradiction.
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For the converse suppose that ϕ ∈ Γm for all m ≤ n, and ⊟ϕ /∈ Γn. Thus
¬ ⊟ ϕ ∈ Γn, and hence x¬ϕ ∈ Γn. By clause 3 above, ¬ϕ ∈ Γm for some m ≤ n,
which would contradict the assumption. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8.4 (Soundness and completeness). Let CS be a constant specifi-
cation for LPLTLP(Ax).
1. Suppose that (generalize) ∈ Ax. If ϕ is provable in LPLTLP(Ax)CS, then M ⊧ ϕ
for all LPLTLP(Ax)CS-models M.
2. Suppose that (generalize) /∈ Ax. ϕ is provable in LPLTLP(Ax)CS iff M ⊧ ϕ for
all LPLTLP(Ax)CS-models M.
Proof. The proof of soundness of LPLTLP(Ax), for arbitrary Ax, is straightfor-
ward.
Now suppose (generalize) is not in Ax. The proof of completeness of LPLTLP(Ax)
is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.8 by constructing a canonical model. Let
M = (r,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) be the χ-canonical model for CS with respect to an ac-
ceptable sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) for LPLTLP(Ax)CS. Truth Lemma can be proved as
before. The only new part is to show thatM is an LPLTLP(Ax)CS-model. We only
check the details for (◻-access) and (⊟-generalize), the case of other principles are
straightforward.
Let us show that the χ-canonical model of LPLTLP(Ax), where (◻-access) is in
Ax, satisfies the (◻-access-E) condition of Definition 8.2. Suppose ◻ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t).
We want to show that ϕ ∈ Ei(r(m),⇓ t) for all m ≥ n. It is enough to show that
[⇓ t]iϕ ∈ Γm for all m ≥ n. From Definition 7.5, we get [t]i ◻ ϕ ∈ Γn. From axiom
(◻-access), we get ◻ [⇓ t]iϕ ∈ Γn. Thus, by Lemma 8.3, we have [⇓ t]iϕ ∈ Γm for
all m ≥ n.
Let us now show that the χ-canonical model of LPLTLP(Ax), where (⊟-generalize)
is in Ax, satisfies the (⊟-generalize-E) condition of Definition 8.2. Suppose ϕ ∈
Ei(r(m), t) for all m ≤ n, and thus [t]iϕ ∈ Γm for all m ≤ n. By Lemma 8.3,
we get ⊟ [t]iϕ ∈ Γn. From axiom (⊟-generalize), we have [⇑P t]i ⊟ ϕ ∈ Γn. Thus,
⊟ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n),⇑P t) as desired.
We leave the completeness of LPLTLP(Ax), where Ax contains (generalize), as
an open problem. In Sections 8.3 and 8.4 we achieve the completeness of logics
involving (generalize) by changing the justification logic part of LPLTLP.
8.2 Interpreted systems
An interpreted system I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) for LPLTLP(Ax) is an
interpreted system for LPLTLP satisfying the evidence function conditions from
Definition 8.2 depending on axioms in Ax and possibly some conditions on the ac-
cessibility relations depending on axioms in Ax (see conditions below). We consider
the following conditions on the accessibility relations. Let n,n′ ∈ N, let r, r′ ∈ R,
and let i ∈ Ag:
1. If r(n)Rir′(n′), then r(n + 1)Rir′(n′ + 1). (◯-left-R)
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2. If r(n)Rir′(n′) and n > 0, then n′ > 0 and r(n − 1)Rir′(n′ − 1). ( s -left-R)
3. If r(n)Rir′(n′), then for all m′ ≤ n′ there is m ≤ n such that r(m)Rir′(m′).
(⊟-generalize-R)
It is obvious that (◯-left-R) implies that if r(n)Rir′(n′), then r(n+k)Rir′(n′+
k) for all k ≥ 0, and ( s -left-R) implies that if r(n)Rir′(n′), then n ≤ n′ and
r(n − k)Rir′(n′ − k) for all k ≤ n.
Theorem 8.5 (Soundness and completeness). The following results hold.
1. Let Ax = {(◯-access)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete with re-
spect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specification)
and (◯-access-E).
2. Let Ax = {(w -access)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete with re-
spect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specification)
and (w-access-E).
3. Let Ax = {(◯-left)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete with re-
spect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specification),
(◯-left-E) and (◯-left-R).
4. Let Ax = {( s -left)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS, where CS ≠ ∅, is sound and com-
plete with respect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant
specification), ( s -left-E) and ( s -left-R).
5. Let Ax = {(⊟-generalize)} and CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant
specification for LPLTLP(Ax). Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete
with respect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant speci-
fication), (⊟-generalize-E) and (⊟-generalize-R).
6. Let Ax = {(◻-access), ( s -left)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS, where CS ≠ ∅, is sound
and complete with respect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (con-
stant specification), (◻-access-E), ( s -left-E), and ( s -left-R).
7. Let Ax = {(◯-right), ( s -left)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS, where CS ≠ ∅, is sound
and complete with respect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (con-
stant specification), (◯-right-E), ( s -left-E), and ( s -left-R).
8. Let Ax = {(⊟-access), (◯-left)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete
with respect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specifi-
cation), (⊟-access-E), (◯-left-E) and (◯-left-R).
9. Let Ax = {(w -right), (◯-left)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete
with respect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specifi-
cation), (w-right-E), (◯-left-E) and (◯-left-R).
10. Let Ax = {( s -right), (◯-left)}. Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete
with respect to all interpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specifi-
cation), ( s -right-E), (◯-left-E) and (◯-left-R).
Proof. We only show the completeness parts of items 4 and 5, the proof of other
items are simpler.
LetAx = {( s -left)}, and CS be a non-empty constant specification for LPLTLP(Ax).
For completeness, we have to verify that the χ-canonical model of LPLTLP(Ax)CS
29
satisfies the conditions ( s -left-E) and ( s -left-R). We leave it to the reader to
verify the details of the proof for condition ( s -left-E).
To check the condition ( s -left-R), suppose that ΓnRiΓ ′n′ and n > 0. We first
show that n′ > 0, and we do this by contradiction. Suppose that n′ = 0, which
means that Γ ′n′ is initial. Since CS ≠ ∅, there is [c]iϕ ∈ CS. Since n > 0, we get
[c]iϕ ∈ Γn−1. Then s [c]iϕ ∈ Γn. From axiom ( s -left), we infer [⇚P c]i s ϕ ∈ Γn.
Since ΓnRiΓ ′n′ , we have s ϕ ∈ Γ
′
n′ which would contradict the the fact that Γ
′
n′ is
initial (see Lemma 4.8).
Now we show that Γn−1RiΓ ′n′−1. Suppose [t]iϕ ∈ Γn−1. Then s [t]iϕ ∈ Γn. From
axiom ( s -left), we infer [⇚P t]i s ϕ ∈ Γn. Since ΓnRiΓ ′n′ , we have s ϕ ∈ Γ
′
n′ , and
thus ϕ ∈ Γ ′n′−1 as desired.
Let Ax = {(⊟-generalize)}. For completeness, we have to verify that the χ-
canonical model of LPLTLP(Ax)CS satisfies the conditions (⊟-generalize-E) and
(⊟-generalize-R). The proof for condition (⊟-generalize-E) is similar to that given
in Theorem 8.4.
To check the condition (⊟-generalize-R), suppose that ΓnRiΓ ′n′ and m
′ < n′
(the case of m′ = n′ is trivial). Assume towards a contradiction that for all m ≤ n
it is not the case that ΓmRiΓ ′m′ . Thus, for every m ≤ n there is a formula [t
m]iϕm
in Γm such that ¬ϕ
m ∈ Γ ′m′ , i.e. we have
[t0]iϕ0 ∈ Γ0, [t1]iϕ1 ∈ Γ1, . . . , [tn]iϕn ∈ Γn, (10)
¬ϕ0,¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕn ∈ Γ ′m′ . (11)
Since CS is axiomatically appropriate we have
[cj]i(ϕj → ϕ0 ∨ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn) ∈ Γj
for some justification constants c0, c1, . . . , cn. Let s ∶= c0 ⋅ t0 + c1 ⋅ t1 + ⋯ + cn ⋅ tn.
From (10) and axioms (application) and (sum) we get
[s]i(ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn) ∈ Γ0 ∩ Γ1 ∩ . . . ∩ Γn.
By Lemma 8.3, we conclude that
⊟ [s]i(ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn) ∈ Γn.
From axiom (⊟-generalize) we get
[⇑P s]i ⊟ (ϕ0 ∨ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) ∈ Γn.
Since ΓnRiΓ ′n′ , we have
⊟(ϕ0 ∨ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) ∈ Γ ′n′ .
By Lemma 8.3, we conclude that
ϕ0 ∨ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ϕn ∈ Γ ′m′ ,
which would contradict (11). ⊓⊔
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8.3 LPLTLP with indexed application operators
In this section we formalize temporal justification logics with indexed application
operators, denoted by LPLTLI .3 Terms and formulas of temporal justification log-
ics with indexed application operators are constructed by the following mutual
grammar:
t ∶∶= c ∣ x ∣ !t ∣ t + t ∣ t ⋅ϕ t ,
ϕ ∶∶= P ∣  ∣ ϕ→ ϕ ∣◯ϕ ∣ w ϕ ∣ ϕU ϕ ∣ ϕS ϕ ∣ [t]iϕ .
Axioms and rules of LPLTLI are exactly the same as for LPLTLP, except that
axiom (application) is replaced by the following axiom
– [t]i(ϕ→ ψ)→ ([s]iϕ→ [t ⋅ϕ s]iψ).
Interpreted systems for LPLTLICS and LPLTL
I
CS-models are defined as in Defi-
nitions 5.3 and 11.1 respectively with the difference that condition (application)
of Definition 5.2 is replaced by the following condition:
– if ϕ→ ψ ∈ Ei(w, t) and ϕ ∈ Ei(w,s), then ψ ∈ Ei(w, t ⋅ϕ s).
The notions of LPLTLICS-validity is defined as usual. The proof of soundness
and completeness theorems for annotated justification logics with respect to their
models is similar to that of LPLTLP.
Theorem 8.6. Let CS be a constant specification for LPLTLI . The formula ϕ is
provable in LPLTLICS iff M ⊧ ϕ for all LPLTL
I
CS-models M.
In order to prove completeness of logics involving axiom (generalize), we need
to change the notion of subformula. The following definition is inspired by the
work of Marti and Studer [20].
Definition 8.7. For a formula χ, its set of subformulas Subf(χ) is defined similar
to Sub(χ) except on justification assertions which is defined by induction on terms
as follows:
– Subf([x]iϕ) ∶= {[x]iϕ} ∪ Subf(ϕ).
– Subf([c]iϕ) ∶= {[c]iϕ} ∪ Subf(ϕ).
– Subf([t + s]iϕ) ∶= {[t + s]iϕ} ∪ Subf([t]iϕ) ∪ Subf([s]iϕ).
– Subf([s ⋅ϕ t]iψ) ∶= {[s ⋅ϕ t]iψ} ∪ Subf([s]i(ϕ→ ψ)) ∪ Subf([t]iϕ).
– Subf([!t]iϕ) ∶= {[!t]iϕ} ∪ Subf(ϕ).
– Subf([⇑ t]iϕ) ∶= {[⇑ t]iϕ} ∪ Subf(ϕ), ϕ is not boxed.
– Subf([⇑ t]i ◻ϕ) ∶= {[⇑ t]i ◻ ϕ} ∪ Subf(¬ [t]iϕ).
3 The indexed application operators were first suggested by Renne [22].
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8.4 Completeness for (generalize)
As before let LPLTLI(Ax) denote the result of adding axioms from Ax to LPLTLI .
To keep the notation simple, let Lgen denote LPLTLI({(generalize)}). In this section
we aim to prove completeness of Lgen.
For a formula χ, let
Bχ ∶= Subf(χ) ∪ Subf(⊺S w ) ∪ Subf{⊺U ¬ [t]iϕ ∣ [⇑ t]i ◻ϕ ∈ Subf(χ)},
Subf+(χ) ∶= Bχ ∪ {¬ψ ∣ ψ ∈ Bχ}.
LetMCS⇑χ denote the set of all χ-maximally LCS-consistent subsets of Subf
+(χ).
For Γ ∈MCS, let4
Γ ∶= Γ ∩ Subf+(χ).
Note that all the results of Section 4 are valid if Sub+(χ) is replaced by
Subf+(χ), and ⊢CS is replaced by ⊢Lgen
CS
. Since the proofs of the results of Sec-
tion 4 have been given in details, we only outline the necessary changes here while
omitting the proofs.
Lemma 8.8.
MCS
⇑
χ = {Γ ∣ Γ ∈MCS}.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2 . ⊓⊔
Lemma 8.9. Let Γ ∈MCS⇑χ.
1. If ϕ ∈ Bχ and ϕ /∈ Γ , then ¬ϕ ∈ Γ .
2. If ϕ ∈ Subf+(χ) and Γ ⊢Lgen
CS
ϕ, then ϕ ∈ Γ .
3. If ψ ∈ Subf+(χ), ϕ ∈ Γ and ⊢Lgen
CS
ϕ→ ψ, then ψ ∈ Γ .
Proof. The proof of all items are standard. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8.10. If either ϕU ψ ∈ Subf+(χ) or ϕS ψ ∈ Subf+(χ), then ϕ,ψ ∈ Bχ.
Proof. We first show that if ϕU ψ ∈ Subf+(χ), then ϕ,ψ ∈ Bχ. There are three
cases:
1. ϕU ψ ∈ Subf(χ). Clearly ϕ,ψ ∈ Subf(χ), and hence ϕ,ψ ∈ Bχ.
2. ϕ = ⊺, ψ = ¬ [t]iσ such that [⇑ t]i◻σ ∈ Subf(χ). Then from ¬ [t]iσ ∈ Subf([⇑ t]i◻
σ), it follows that ψ ∈ Subf(χ). Thus ϕ,ψ ∈ Bχ.
3. ϕU ψ ∈ Subf(¬ [t]iσ) such that [⇑ t]i◻σ ∈ Subf(χ). In this case ϕU ψ ∈ Subf(σ).
Since σ ∈ Subf(χ), we get ϕU ψ ∈ Subf(χ) and we reduce to case 1.
Now we show that if ϕS ψ ∈ Subf+(χ), then ϕ,ψ ∈ Bχ. There are three cases:
1. ϕS ψ ∈ Subf(χ). Clearly ϕ,ψ ∈ Subf(χ), and hence ϕ,ψ ∈ Bχ.
2. ϕ = ⊺, ψ = w . Then ϕ,ψ ∈ Bχ as desired.
4 For simplicity we use the same symbol Γ as in Section 4.
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3. ϕS ψ ∈ Subf(⊺U ¬ [t]iσ) such that [⇑ t]i ◻ σ ∈ Subf(χ). In this case ϕS ψ ∈
Subf(¬ [t]iσ), and hence ϕS ψ ∈ Subf([t]iσ). Since ¬ [t]iσ ∈ Subf([⇑ t]i ◻ σ),
we get ϕS ψ ∈ Subf(χ) and we reduce to case 1. ⊓⊔
Using Lemma 8.10, it is not difficult to show the following results (the proofs
are similar to the proofs of Lemmas 4.14 and 4.16 and thus are omitted here).
Lemma 8.11. For every Γ ∈ MCS⇑χ, if ϕU ψ ∈ Γ , then there exists a ϕU ψ-
sequence starting with Γ .
Lemma 8.12. For every Γ ∈ MCS⇑χ, if ϕS ψ ∈ Γ , then there exists a ϕS ψ-
sequence ending with Γ .
Corollary 8.13. For every Γ ∈MCSχ, there is an acceptable sequence containing
Γ .
The following is an auxiliary lemma to be used in the proof of completeness.
Lemma 8.14. Let (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) be an acceptable sequence of elements of MCS⇑χ. If
[⇑ t]i ◻ϕ ∈ Subf(χ) and [t]iϕ ∈ Γm for all m ≥ n, then [⇑ t]i ◻ϕ ∈ Γn.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that [⇑ t]i ◻ ϕ /∈ Γn. Thus ¬ [⇑ t]i ◻ ϕ ∈
Γn, and then by (generalize) we have ¬ ◻ [t]iϕ ∈ Γn. Hence ◇¬ [t]iϕ ∈ Γn. Note
that ◇¬ [t]iϕ is an abbreviation for ⊺U ¬ [t]iϕ. On the other hand, from [⇑ t]i ◻
ϕ ∈ Subf(χ) it follows that ⊺U ¬ [t]iϕ ∈ Subf+(χ). Thus ⊺U ¬ [t]iϕ ∈ Γn. Since
(Γ0, Γ1, . . .) is an acceptable sequence, there exists m ≥ n such that ¬ [t]iϕ ∈ Γm,
and hence ¬ [t]iϕ ∈ Γm which contradicts the hypothesis of the Lemma. ⊓⊔
Given an Lgen-model M = (r,S,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) for CS and a ternary relation
B ⊆ S ×Tm × Fml and an agent i, we define an operator
ΦBi ∶ ℘(S ×Tm × Fml) → ℘(S ×Tm × Fml)
for CS by
ΦBi (X) ∶= {(r(n), t, ϕ) ∣
(r(n), t, ϕ) ∈ B ∨
∃r, s(t = r + s ∧ ((r(n), r,ϕ) ∈X ∨ (r(n), s,ϕ) ∈X)) ∨
∃r, s,ψ(t = r ⋅ψ s ∧ (r(n), r,ψ → ϕ) ∈ X ∧ (r(n), s,ψ) ∈X) ∨
∃r,ψ(t =!r ∧ϕ = [r]iψ ∧ (r(n), r,ψ) ∈ X) ∨
∃r,ψ(t =⇑ r ∧ ϕ = ◻ψ ∧ ∀m ≥ n(r(m), r,ψ) ∈X)}
Obviously ΦBi is monotone, i.e.
X ⊆ Y implies ΦBi (X) ⊆ Φ
B
i (Y ).
Therefore, ΦBi has a least fixed point, which we denote by E
B
i . That means E
B
i is
the least X ⊆ S ×Tm × Fml with X = ΦBi (X).
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Definition 8.15. Let (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) be an acceptable sequence of elements of MCS⇑χ
for Lgen
CS
. We define the relations Bi ⊆ S ×Tm × Fml for each agent i by:
(Γn, t, ϕ) ∈ Bi iff [t]iϕ ∈ Γn.
The χ-canonical model M = (r,S,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) for CS with respect to (Γ0, Γ1, . . .)
is defined as follows:
1. S ∶= {Γ0, Γ1, . . .}.
2. r(n) ∶= Γn, for all n ∈ N.
3. Ei(Γn, t) ∶= {ϕ ∣ (Γn, t, ϕ) ∈ EBii }.
4. ν(n) ∶= Prop ∩ Γn.
Lemma 8.16. The χ-canonical model M = (r,S,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) for CS with respect
to an acceptable sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) is an L
gen
CS
-model.
Proof. We only verify the condition (generalize-E) of Definition 8.2. Suppose that
ϕ ∈ Ei(r(m), t) for all m ≥ n. Thus (r(m), t, ϕ) ∈ EBii for all m ≥ n. Since E
Bi
i is a
fixed point of ΦBii , we immediately get (r(n),⇑ t,◻ϕ) ∈ E
Bi
i . Hence ◻ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n),⇑
t), as desired. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8.17. If [t]iϕ ∈ Subf+(χ) and (r(n), t, ϕ) ∈ EBii , then [t]iϕ ∈ Γn.
Proof. By induction on the build-up of EBii . We distinguish the following cases:
1. Base case. The case (r(n), t, ϕ) ∈ Bi is trivial.
2. ∃r, s(t = r + s ∧ ((r(n), r,ϕ) ∈ EBii ∨ (r(n), s,ϕ) ∈ E
Bi
i )). Since [t]iϕ ∈ Subf
+(χ)
we get [r]iϕ ∈ Subf+(χ) and [s]iϕ ∈ Subf+(χ). By I.H. we get [r]iϕ ∈ Γn or
[s]iϕ ∈ Γn. Then [r + s]iϕ ∈ Γn, and thus [t]iϕ ∈ Γn. The case where t = r ⋅ψ s
or t =!r is treated similarly.
3. ∃r,ψ(t =⇑ r ∧ϕ = ◻ψ ∧ ∀m ≥ n(r(m), r,ψ) ∈ EBii ). It is easy to show that from
[t]iϕ ∈ Subf+(χ) it follows that [t]iϕ ∈ Subf(χ) and [r]iψ ∈ Subf+(χ). By the
induction hypothesis, for all m ≥ n we have [r]iψ ∈ Γm. By Lemma 8.14, we
get [⇑ r]i ◻ψ ∈ Γn, and therefore [t]iϕ ∈ Γn as desired. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8.18 (Truth Lemma). Let M = (r,S,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) be the χ-canonical
model for CS with respect to an acceptable sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . .). For every formula
ψ ∈ Subf+(χ), and every n ∈ N we have:
(M, r(n)) ⊧ ψ iff ψ ∈ Γn.
Proof. As usual, the proof is by induction on the structure of ψ. We show only
the following case:
– ψ = [t]iϕ.
(⇒) If (M, r(n)) ⊧ [t]iϕ, then (r(n), t, ϕ) ∈ EBii . Thus, by Lemma 8.17, [t]iϕ ∈
Γn.
(⇐) If [t]iϕ ∈ Γn, then (r(n), t, ϕ) ∈ EBii . By (reflexivity), we have ϕ ∈ Γn and
by I.H. we get (M, r(n)) ⊧ ϕ. We conclude (M, r(n)) ⊧ [t]iϕ. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 8.19 (Soundness and completeness). Let CS be a constant specifi-
cation for Lgen. Then we have ⊢Lgen
CS
ϕ iff M ⊧ ϕ for all Lgen
CS
-models M.
Theorem 8.20 (Soundness and completeness). Let Ax = {(generalize), (◯-left)}.
Then LPLTLI(Ax)CS is sound and complete with respect to all interpreted systems
of LPLTLI satisfying (generalize-E), (◯-left-E), and (◯-left-R).
Proof. We detail the proof for the soundness part. The proof of completeness is
similar to the proof of Theorem 8.19.
Let Ax = {(generalize), (◯-left)} and I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) be
an arbitrary interpreted system for LPLTLI(Ax). For an arbitrary r ∈ R and
n ∈ N, assume (I, r, n) ⊧ ◻ [t]iϕ. Thus, (I, r,m) ⊧ [t]iϕ for every m ≥ n. Hence,
ϕ ∈ Ei(r(m), t) for every m ≥ n. By (generalize-E), we get ◻ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n),⇑ t).
Now let r(n)Rir′(n′) and m′ ≥ n′, for arbitrary r′ ∈R and arbitrary n′,m′ ∈ N. By
(◯-left-R) we have r(n+m′−n′)Rir′(m′). On the other hand, from the assumption
we have (I, r, n +m′ − n′) ⊧ [t]iϕ. Thus, (I, r′,m′) ⊧ ϕ. Since m′ ≥ n′ was chosen
arbitrary we get (I, r′, n′) ⊧ ◻ϕ, and since r′(n′) was chosen arbitrary, we get
(I, r, n) ⊧ [⇑ t]i ◻ ϕ as desired. ⊓⊔
We close this section with remarking that it is quit possible to extend this com-
pleteness result to extensions of Lgen. For example consider the logic LPLTLI(Ax)
where Ax = {(generalize), (⊟-generalize)}. In order to prove completeness for
LPLTLI(Ax), redefine the operator ΦBi as follows:
ΦBi (X) ∶= {(r(n), t, ϕ) ∣
(r(n), t, ϕ) ∈ B ∨
∃r, s(t = r + s ∧ ((r(n), r,ϕ) ∈X ∨ (r(n), s,ϕ) ∈X)) ∨
∃r, s,ψ(t = r ⋅ψ s ∧ (r(n), r,ψ → ϕ) ∈ X ∧ (r(n), s,ψ) ∈X) ∨
∃r,ψ(t =!r ∧ϕ = [r]iψ ∧ (r(n), r,ψ) ∈ X) ∨
∃r,ψ(t =⇑ r ∧ ϕ = ◻ψ ∧ ∀m ≥ n(r(m), r,ψ) ∈X) ∨
∃r,ψ(t =⇑P r ∧ϕ = ⊟ψ ∧ ∀m ≤ n(r(m), r,ψ) ∈X)}
The rest of the proof of soundness and completeness is similar to that of Lgen.
9 Internalization
Definition 9.1. A justification logic L satisfies internalization if for each formula
ϕ with ⊢L ϕ and for each agent i, there exists a term t with ⊢L [t]iϕ.
LPLTLP satisfies a restricted form of internalization.
Lemma 9.2. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for
LPLTL
P. For each formula ϕ and each i, if ⊢CS ϕ, and (MP) and (iax-nec) are the
only rules that are used in the derivation of ϕ, then ⊢CS [t]iϕ for some term t.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of ϕ.
In case ϕ is an axiom, since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant
c with
⊢CS [c]iϕ.
In case ϕ is derived by modus ponens from ψ → ϕ and ψ, then, by the induction
hypothesis, there are terms s1 and s2 such that [s1]i(ψ → ϕ) and [s2]iψ are
provable. Using (application) and modus ponens, we obtain [s1 ⋅ s2]iϕ.
In case ϕ is [cjn]in . . . [cj1]i1ψ, derived using (iax-nec), since CS is axiomatically
appropriate, we can use (iax-nec) again to obtain [cjn+1]iϕ for some justification
constant cjn+1 . ⊓⊔
Next we shall extend LPLTLP to obtain a justification logic with the internal-
ization property. Although the following two formulas are provable in LPLTLP, see
Lemma 3.3, in order to get the internalization property we need to add them as
axioms:
1. ◻ϕ→◯ϕ (mix1)
2. ⊟ϕ→ w ϕ (mix2)
Let LPLTLint be the logic LPLTLP extended by the axioms (generalize),
(⊟-generalize), (mix1), and (mix2).
Theorem 9.3 (Internalization). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate con-
stant specification for LPLTLint. The system LPLTLintCS enjoys internalization.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ is provable in LPLTLintCS. Let i be an arbitrary agent. We
have to show that [t]iϕ is provable in LPLTLintCS, for some term t. We proceed by
induction on the derivation of ϕ. We only consider the following cases:
In case ϕ is ◻ψ, derived using (◻-nec), then, by the induction hypothesis, there
is a term s such that [s]iψ is provable. Now, we can use (◻-nec) in order to obtain
◻ [s]iψ and then (generalize) and modus ponens to get [⇑ s]i ◻ ψ.
In case ϕ is ◯ψ, derived using (◯-nec), then, as above, we obtain [⇑ s]i ◻ ψ.
Since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c with [c]i(◻ψ →◯ψ).
Thus we finally conclude [c ⋅ ⇑ s]i◯ψ.
In case ϕ is ⊟ψ, derived using (⊟-nec), then, by the induction hypothesis, there
is a term s such that [s]iψ is provable. Now, we can use (⊟-nec) in order to obtain
⊟ [s]iψ and then (⊟-generalize) and modus ponens to get [⇑P s]i ⊟ ψ.
In case ϕ is w ψ, derived using (w -nec), then, as above, we obtain [⇑P s]i ⊟ψ.
Since CS is axiomatically appropriate, there is a constant c with [c]i(⊟ψ → w ψ).
Thus we finally conclude [c ⋅ ⇑P s]iw ψ. ⊓⊔
Remark 9.4. It is worth noting that there are already some known temporal justi-
fication logics that satisfy internalization, although they are formalized using only
future operators. Bucheli in [5] show that, for axiomatically appropriate constant
specifications, the logics LPLTL+(generalize)+(◯-access) and LPLTL+(generalize)+
(◻-access)+(◯-left) satisfy internalization.5 In [6] the authors introduced another
extension of LPLTL, which was called LPLTL⋆ there, that satisfies internalization.
5 Note that the background logic used by Bucheli in [5] is different from LPLTL.
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Theorem 9.5 (Internalization). Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate con-
stant specification for LPLTLP(Ax) where
{(generalize), (⊟-generalize), (◯-access), (w -access)} ⊆ Ax.
Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS enjoys internalization.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 9.3. We only consider the
following cases:
In case ϕ is ◯ψ, derived using (◯-nec), then, as in the proof of Theorem 9.3,
we obtain [⇑ s]i ◻ ψ. Then, by (◯-access), we get [↓⇑ s]i◯ψ.
In case ϕ is w ψ, derived using (w -nec), then, as in the proof of Theorem 9.3,
we obtain [⇑P s]i ⊟ψ. Then, by (w -access), we get [↓P⇑P s]iw ψ. ⊓⊔
In Theorems 9.3 and 9.5 we present two logics that satisfy internalization. We
now prove that these two logics have the following relationship.
Lemma 9.6. Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for
LPLTLP(Ax) where {(mix1), (mix2)} ⊆ Ax. For every agent i, formula ϕ and term t
there are terms s1(t) and s2(t) such that
⊢
LPLTL
P(Ax)CS
[t]i ◻ϕ→ [s1(t)]i◯ϕ, and
⊢
LPLTL
P(Ax)CS
[t]i ⊟ ϕ→ [s1(t)]iwϕ.
Thus, versions of (◯-access) and (w -access) are derivable in LPLTLP(Ax)CS.
Proof. Since CS is axiomatically appropriate and (mix1) and (mix2) are axioms of
LPLTLint, there are justification constants a and b such that [a]i(◻ϕ →◯ϕ) ∈ CS
and [b]i(⊟ϕ→ w ϕ) ∈ CS. Thus
⊢LPLTLint
CS
[t]i ◻ϕ→ [a ⋅ t]i◯ϕ, and
⊢LPLTLint
CS
[t]i ⊟ ϕ→ [b ⋅ t]iw ϕ
Finally put s1(t) ∶= a ⋅ t and s2(t) ∶= b ⋅ t. ⊓⊔
Combining Theorems 9.3, 9.5 with the results of Section 8.4 we then can obtain
temporal justification logics, based on LPLTLI , that satisfy both internalization
and completeness. Note that, since (mix1) and (mix2) are true in all LPLTLI -
models, the class of all models of
LPLTLI({(generalize), (⊟-generalize), (mix1), (mix2)})
is the same as the class of all models of
LPLTL
I({(generalize), (⊟-generalize)}).
Theorem 9.7 (Completeness and Internalization). Let L be the logic LPLTLI
extended by either of the following set of axioms:
1. {(generalize), (⊟-generalize), (mix1), (mix2)}, or
2. {(generalize), (⊟-generalize), (◯-access), (w -access)}.
Let CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for L. Then LCS en-
joys internalization and is sound and complete with respect to LCS-models.
Proof. Follows from Theorems 9.3, 9.5, 8.19. ⊓⊔
37
10 No forgetting and no learning
No forgetting (or perfect recall) and no learning are two well known properties of
systems that can be expressed in the language of logics of knowledge and time.
It seems that the axioms (◻-access) and (⊟-access) correspond respectively to the
notions of no forgetting and no learning on justifications. Lets make this precise.
A formula ϕ is said to be stable with respect to the future if once it is true
it remains true, i.e. ⊢ ϕ → ◻ϕ. It is known that if a logic contains the axiom
Ki◻ϕ→ ◻Kiϕ, then for every formula ϕ which is stable with respect to the future
it can be shown that ⊢ Kiϕ→ ◻Kiϕ, i.e. if ϕ is known at some point then it remains
known at all points in the future (see [8]). We show that logics that contain axiom
(◻-access), i.e. [t]i ◻ϕ→ ◻ [⇓ t]iϕ, have a similar property.
Theorem 10.1. Let Ax ⊇ {(◻-access)} and let LPLTLP(Ax)CS be a justification
logic that satisfies internalization. If
⊢LPLTLP(Ax)CS ϕ→ ◻ϕ,
then for every term t there is a term s(t) such that
⊢LPLTLP(Ax)CS [t]iϕ→ ◻ [s(t)]iϕ.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ→ ◻ϕ is provable in LPLTLP(Ax)CS, whereAx ⊇ {(◻-access)}.
Thus, by the internalization property, we get [r]i(ϕ → ◻ϕ) for some term r.
Hence, [x]iϕ → [r ⋅ϕ x]i ◻ ϕ, and therefore by axiom (◻-access) we get [x]iϕ →
◻ [⇓ (r ⋅ϕ x)]iϕ. Thus, for every term t it is enough to put s ∶=⇓ (r ⋅ϕ t). ⊓⊔
Using past time operators, a similar argument can be done for no learning. A
formula ϕ is said to be stable with respect to the past if once it is true it has always
been true, i.e. ⊢ ϕ → ⊟ϕ. Using axiom Ki ⊟ ϕ → ⊟Kiϕ, it is easy to show that for
every formula ϕ which is stable with respect to the past we have ⊢ Kiϕ → ⊟Kiϕ,
i.e. if ϕ is known at some point then it has always been known at all points in the
past. Note that, since ⊟ψ → xψ is a valid formula for every ψ, Kiϕ → ⊟Kiϕ in
turn entails Kiϕ → xKiϕ, i.e. if ϕ is known at some point then it was known at
some points in the past. We show that logics that contain axiom (⊟-access), i.e.
[t]i ⊟ϕ→ ⊟ [⇓P t]iϕ, have a similar property.
Theorem 10.2. Let Ax ⊇ {(⊟-access)} and let LPLTLP(Ax)CS be a justification
logic that satisfies internalization. If
⊢LPLTLP(Ax)CS ϕ→ ⊟ϕ,
then for every term t there is a term s(t) such that
⊢
LPLTL
P(Ax)CS
[t]iϕ→ ⊟ [s(t)]iϕ.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ→ ⊟ϕ is provable in LPLTLP(Ax)CS, whereAx ⊇ {(⊟-access)}.
Thus, by the internalization property, we get [r]i(ϕ → ⊟ϕ) for some term r.
Hence, [x]iϕ → [r ⋅ϕ x]i ⊟ ϕ, and therefore by axiom (⊟-access) we get [x]iϕ →
⊟ [⇓P (r ⋅ϕ x)]iϕ. Thus, for every term t it is enough to put s ∶=⇓P (r ⋅ϕ t). ⊓⊔
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It is known that the following principles would characterize systems with no
forgetting (nf) and no learning (nl) respectively (cf. [8, 15]):
– KiϕS Kiψ → Ki(KiϕS Kiψ) (nf)
– KiϕU Kiψ → Ki(KiϕU Kiψ) (nl)
Now let us consider the justification counterparts of axioms (nf) and (nl). The
following could be considered as justification counterparts of (nf) and (nl) respec-
tively
– [t]iϕS [s]iψ → [nf(t, s)]i([t]iϕS [s]iψ) (jnf)
– [t]iϕU [s]iψ → [nl(t, s)]i([t]iϕU [s]iψ) (jnl)
where nf and nl are two binary new term operators.
Now we give a semantics for the logic LPLTLP{(jnf), (jnl)} similar to the se-
mantics of Section 7. Given a constant specification CS for LPLTLP{(jnf), (jnl)},
an LPLTLP{(jnf), (jnl)}CS-model is defined in the same manner as LPLTLP-models
(see Definition 7.1) with the following additional conditions (jnf) and (jnl) on
evidence functions:
– If there is somem with n ≥m ≥ 0 such that ψ ∈ Ei(r(n−m), s) and for all k with
0 ≤ k < m we have ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n − k), t), then [t]iϕS [s]iψ ∈ Ei(r(n), nf(t, s)).
(jnf)
– If there is some m ≥ 0 such that ψ ∈ Ei(r(n +m), s) and ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n + k), t) for
all k with 0 ≤ k <m, then [t]iϕU [s]iψ ∈ Ei(r(n), nl(t, s)). (jnl)
Soundness and completeness of LPLTLP{(jnf), (jnl)} is proved similar to that
of LPLTLP in Section 7.
Theorem 10.3 (Soundness and completeness). Let L = LPLTLP{(jnf), (jnl)}.
For each formula χ and finite set of formulas T , we have T ⊩LCS χ iff T ⊢LCS χ.
Proof. Straightforward. ⊓⊔
Next, we will show soundness and completeness with respect to interpreted sys-
tems.
Theorem 10.4 (Soundness and completeness). Let Ax = {(jnf), ( s -left)}.
Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS, where CS ≠ ∅, is sound and complete with respect to all in-
terpreted systems of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specification), (jnf), ( s -left-E),
and ( s -left-R).
Proof. We only concentrate on soundness by showing that (jnf) is valid. The com-
pleteness part is proved similar to that of LPLTLP in Section 6.
Let I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) be an arbitrary interpreted system
satisfying (jnf) and ( s -left-R). For an arbitrary r ∈ R and n ∈ N, assume
(I, r, n) ⊧ [t]iϕS [s]iψ. We distinguish the following possibilities.
If n = 0, then (I, r, n) ⊧ [s]iψ. By (jnf), it is obvious that [t]iϕS [s]iψ ∈
Ei(r(n), nf(t, s)). Now let r(n)Rir′(n′), for arbitrary r′ ∈ R and arbitrary n′ ∈ N.
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Using the monotonicity condition and the transitivity of Ri, it is easy to show that
(I, r′, n′) ⊧ [s]iψ. Hence, (I, r′, n′) ⊧ [t]iϕS [s]iψ. Therefore
(I, r, n) ⊧ [nf(t, s)]i([t]iϕS [s]iψ).
If n > 0, then for some m with n ≥ m ≥ 0 we have (I, r, n − m) ⊧ [s]iψ
and (I, r, n − k) ⊧ [t]iϕ for all k with 0 ≤ k < m. By (jnf), it is obvious that
[t]iϕS [s]iψ ∈ Ei(r(n), nf(t, s)). Now let r(n)Rir′(n′), for arbitrary r′ ∈ R and
arbitrary n′ ∈ N. By ( s -left-R), we get n ≤ n′ and r(n − k)Rir′(n′ − k′), for all
k ≤ n. Using the monotonicity condition and the transitivity of Ri, it is easy to
show that (I, r′, n′ −m) ⊧ [s]iψ and (I, r′, n′ − k) ⊧ [t]iϕ for all k with 0 ≤ k <m.
Therefore,
(I, r, n) ⊧ [nf(t, s)]i([t]iϕS [s]iψ).
⊓⊔
Theorem 10.5 (Soundness and completeness). Let Ax = {(jnl), (◯-left)}.
Then LPLTLP(Ax)CS is sound and complete with respect to all interpreted systems
of LPLTLP∅ satisfying (constant specification), (jnl), (◯-left-E), and (◯-left-R).
Proof. We only concentrate on soundness by showing that (jnl) is valid. The com-
pleteness part is proved similar to that of LPLTLP in Section 6.
Let I = (R, S,R1, . . . ,Rh,E1, . . . ,Eh, ν) be an arbitrary interpreted system
satisfying (jnl) and (◯-left-R). For an arbitrary r ∈ R and n ∈ N, assume
(I, r, n) ⊧ [t]iϕU [s]iψ. Thus, for some m ≥ 0 we have (I, r, n + m) ⊧ [s]iψ
and (I, r, n + k) ⊧ [t]iϕ for all k with 0 ≤ k < m. By (jnl), it is obvious that
[t]iϕU [s]iψ ∈ Ei(r(n), nl(t, s)). Now let r(n)Rir′(n′), for arbitrary r′ ∈ R and
arbitrary n′ ∈ N. By (◯-left-R), we get r(n+m)Rir′(n′+m). Using the monotonic-
ity condition and the transitivity of Ri, it is easy to show that (I, r′, n′ +m) ⊧
[s]iψ and (I, r′, n′ + k) ⊧ [t]iϕ for all k with 0 ≤ k < m. Therefore, (I, r, n) ⊧
[nl(t, s)]i([t]iϕU [s]iψ). ⊓⊔
To summarize, we have considered two principles corresponding to the notion of
no forgetting, namely (◻-access) and (jnf), and two principles corresponding to the
notion of no learning, namely (⊟-access) and (jnl). In order to show the complete-
ness of a logic containing either (◻-access) or (jnf) we require that the interpreted
systems of that logic satisfy ( s -left-R), and in order to show the completeness of a
logic containing either (⊟-access) or (jnl) we require that the interpreted systems
of that logic satisfy (◯-left-R). Incidentally it is easy to see that the conditions
( s -left-R) and (◯-left-R) corresponds to the requirements that the interpreted
systems satisfying no forgetting and no learning usually meet (see e.g. [8]). Let us
make this more precise.
It is obvious that ( s -left-R) implies that if r(n)Rir′(n′), then n ≤ n′ and
r(n−k)Rir′(n′−k) for all k ≤ n. This in turn entails that if r(n)Rir′(n′), then for
all k ≤ n there exists k′ ≤ n′ such that r(k)Rir′(k′). The latter condition is one of
the characterizations of the notion ‘agent i has perfect recall’ considered in [15].
Moreover, (◯-left-R) implies that if r(n)Rir′(n′), then r(n+k)Rir′(n′+k) for
all k ≥ 0. This in turn entails that if r(n)Rir′(n′), then for all k ≥ n there exists
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k′ ≥ n′ such that r(k)Rir′(k′). The latter condition is one of the characterizations
of the notion ‘agent i does not learn’ (in synchronous systems) considered in [15].
From the results of [23] and [15], it can be shown that Ki◻ϕ→ ◻Kiϕ is provable
in LTLP +(nf). A natural question could arise here immediately: is a version of the
(◻-access) axiom derivable in LPLTLP({(jnf)})? In other words, does it hold that
for every term t, there is a term s(t) such that [t]i ◻ ϕ → ◻ [s(t)]iϕ is provable
in LPLTLP({(jnf)})? Similarly, is a version of the (⊟-access) axiom derivable in
LPLTLP({(jnl)})?
11 Reasoning takes time
In this section we explore more interactions between justification and time. Let us
start with the (application) axiom:
[t]i(ϕ→ ψ) → ([s]iϕ→ [t ⋅ s]iψ).
This axiom says that if agent i knows ϕ → ψ for reason t and knows ϕ for reason
s, then at the same time she knows ψ for reason t ⋅ s. So the agent applies the rule
Modus Ponens (MP) in her reasoning, but this step of reasoning takes no time. This
would be implausible if we expect that reasoning with justifications takes time. The
same argument can be applied to the axioms (sum) and (positive introspection).
In [6] the following principles have been suggested to formalize the idea that
reasoning with justifications takes time:
[t]i(ϕ→ ψ)→ ([s]iϕ→◯ [t ⋅ s]iψ),
[t]iϕ ∨ [s]iϕ→◯ [t + s]iϕ,
[t]iϕ→◯ [!t]i [t]iϕ .
At first sight the above principles seem to be impeccable, but it is not difficult
to show that they have the following implausible consequences:
[t]iϕ→◯ϕ,
[t]iϕ→◯ [t]iϕ,
[t]iϕ→ ◻ [t]iϕ,
[t]iϕ→ ◻ϕ.
In the following we study another variant of the above principles.6 The logic
LTL
J is defined similar to LPLTLP with the difference that axioms of the justifica-
tion part are replaced by the following axioms
1. [t]i(ϕ→ ψ)→ ([s]iϕ→◯ [t ⋅ s]i s ψ) (FP-application)
2. [t]iϕ→◯ [t + s]i s ϕ, [s]iϕ→◯ [t + s]i s ϕ (FP-sum)
3. [t]iϕ→ ϕ (reflexivity)
6 Thanks to Thomas Studer for suggesting me these axioms.
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4. [t]iϕ→◯ [!t]i s [t]iϕ (FP-positive introspection)7
Next we present a semantics for LTLJ.
Definition 11.1. An LTLJCS-model is a tuple M= (r,S,E1 . . . ,Eh, ν) where
1. S is a non-empty set of states;
2. r ∶ N → S is a run on S;
3. Ei is a CS-evidence function for agent i for 1 ≤ i ≤ h;
4. ν ∶ S → P(Prop) is a valuation.
CS-evidence functions should satisfy the following conditions. For all n ∈ N, all
terms s, t ∈ Tm and all formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml,
1. if [t]iϕ ∈ CS, then ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t), (constant specification)
2. if ϕ→ ψ ∈ Ei(r(n), t) and ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), s),
then sψ ∈ Ei(r(n + 1), t ⋅ s), (FP-application)
3. if ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), s) ∪ Ei(r(n), t), then sϕ ∈ Ei(r(n + 1), s + t), (FP-sum)
4. if ϕ ∈ Ei(r(n), t), then s [t]iϕ ∈ Ei(r(n + 1), !t), (FP-positive introspection)
Given a LTLJCS-model M, the truth of a formula in M is defined in the same
manner as in Definition 7.1.
Theorem 11.2 (Soundness and completeness). Let CS be a constant specifi-
cation for LTLJ. Then ⊢
LTL
J
CS
ϕ iff M ⊧ ϕ for all LTLJCS-models M.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. The proof of completeness is similar to the
proof of Theorem 7.8 by constructing a canonical model. Truth Lemma can be
proved as before. The only new part is to show that any χ-canonical model for CS
with respect to an acceptable sequence (Γ0, Γ1, . . .) for LTLJCS is an LTL
J
CS-model.
This is left to the reader. ⊓⊔
Given a set Ax of connecting principles from Section 3, by LTLJ(Ax) we denote
the result of adding axioms from Ax to LTLJ. The above completeness result can
easily be extended to LTLJ(Ax) as well.
In order to prove the completeness of LTLJ with respect to the interpreted
systems we need the condition ( s -left-R), and thus we have to add the principle
( s -left) to LTLJ. The interpreted systems of LTLJ is defined in the same manner as
the interpreted systems of LPLTLP with the difference that the evidence functions
should satisfy conditions of Definition 11.1, instead of conditions of Definition
5.2. For Ax = {( s -left)}, an interpreted system for LTLJ(Ax) is defined to be an
interpreted systems for LTLJ satisfying the conditions ( s -left-E) and ( s -left-R).
Theorem 11.3 (Soundness and completeness). Let CS be a non-empty con-
stant specification for LTLJ(Ax), where Ax = {( s -left)}. Then ⊢
LTL
J(Ax)CS
χ iff
(I, r, n) ⊧ χ, for all interpreted systems I = (R, . . .) of LTLJ(Ax), for all r ∈ R
and all n ∈ N.
7 The prefix FP in the name of these axioms comes from the first letters of “Future”
and “Past”.
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Proof. Soundness is straightforward. The proof of completeness is similar to the
proof of Theorems 6.5 and 8.5 by constructing a canonical model. Truth Lemma
can be proved as before. The only new part is to show that any χ-canonical model
for LTLJ(Ax) is an interpreted system for LTLJ(Ax). This is left to the reader. ⊓⊔
Remark 11.4. Note that since ϕ → ◇ϕ is provable in LTL the following formulas
trivially follows in LPLTL from the axioms (application), (sum), and
(positive introspection):
[t]i(ϕ→ ψ)→ ([s]iϕ→◇ [t ⋅ s]iψ),
[t]iϕ ∨ [s]iϕ→◇ [t + s]iϕ,
[t]iϕ→◇ [!t]i [t]iϕ .
A more realistic set of axioms which do not suffer from the logical omniscience
problem can be formulated as follows:
[t]i(ϕ→ ψ) → ([s]iϕ→ ⟨F ⟩ [t ⋅ s]iψ),
[t]iϕ ∨ [s]iϕ→ ⟨F ⟩ [t + s]iϕ,
[t]iϕ→ ⟨F ⟩ [!t]i [t]iϕ .
where ⟨F ⟩ϕ ∶= ¬ϕ ∧ ◇ϕ. We leave the proof of completeness to possible future
work.
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